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6FOREWORD
This report describes the results of an In-Flight Main-
tenance Study performed under Modification 3 to NASA Contract
NAS9-8144, Microfilm Storage and Display.
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I.	 INTRODUCTION
This stud,, ^ntitled In-Flight Maintenance (IFM), was per-
formed under Contract NAS9-8144, Mod. 3 for the Information Sys-
tems Divi ion, Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas. R. D.
Newlin was NASA Technical Monitor.
The study was concerned with all actions required to obtain
maintainable electronics hardware, and subsequently to maintain
this hardware in the Space Station - Space Base era from 1975 to
1985. Primary emphasis was placed on processing electronics, as
opposed to sensors, controls, displays, actuators, Etc. The Block
II Apollo Guidance and Navigation, Stabilization and Control, and
Telecommunications systems were chosen as hardware examples to
work with, making the assumption that similar functions would be
necessary in a apace base or station.
The study approach and some results are summarized in Section
II of this report, with the objectives and approach covered in
More detail in Section III. The sample systems analysis, redesign,
packaging design, and test and checkout are covered in Section IV
and VI through VII respectively. Section V, entitled IFM require-
ments, is meant to be somewhat autonomous, as it contains some
rationale for methods and requirements necessary to achieve success-
ful in-flight maintenance, along with criteria that may be utilized
as requirements for future contracts. The conclusions in brief form,
and an indication of areas we feel need additional study are given in
Section IX.
The bibliography includes a selected list of the most important
books and papers that were studied, and all of the references cited
in the text.
3f"
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II, SUMMARY
The In-Flight Maintenance (IFM) Study was initiated in May
1969 by NASA-MSC. The Martin Marietta Corporation performed the
work in the Electronics Research Department of the Denver Division.
The study might well have been named "How to make electronic
systems last en years in a Space Station", for fundamentally that
is what was studied. The output of the effort is more far reach-
ing however, for the aim was to develop analysis methods, techni-
ques and criteria that will be useful for many programs, not just
the space station.
In this brief summary we have described little more than the
nature of our findings, methods and conclusions; the details will
be found in the body of this report. However, it is worth noting
that while criteria, guidelines and methods for achieving maintain-
able systems were evolving, a parallel effort was in progress to
test these tools. This was the analysis and subsequent redesign for
maintainability of the Block II Apollo Guidance and Navigation
(G&N), Stabilization Control (SCS) and Telecoinmuni.;ations Systems.
We delved deeply into all of these systems, but we were particu-
r
	 larly fortunate in having personnel available with a comprehensive
background in the G&N and SCS, hence the study results in these
areas are especially gratifying.
While the primary product of the study was to be criteria and
considerations for obtaining maintainable electronics, some of the
methods developed during this study have been tested on other pro-
grams and have proved to be of value.
IFM Requirements
In order to obtain maintainable system, a contracting agency
must clearly identify this intent at the time of the request for
proposal, and reiterate this intent throughout the design phase.
However, without design oriented criteria and guidelines to work
with, each contractor will develop an independent approach to
maintainability, and a contracting agency will find itself with a
proliferation of so-called maintainable designs and unable to ade-
quately measure performance. Clearly some standardization con-
straint on design is desirable, for otherwise we shall surely lose
the economies possible in packaging, structure, cooling, test and
checkout, sparing, and other factors affecting both non-recurring
.I:
	 and recurring cost.
r
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In examining existing criteria relating to maintenance, it
was found that they tended to be oriented toward human factors, 	 M
or were mission guidelines. Certainly these are important con-
siderations for achieving maintenance capability but truly de-
sign oriented criteria are needed, relating, for instance, to
analysis, packaging, malfunction detection and fault isolation,
redundancy, commonality and spares. During this study 53 such
criteria were developed. These were applied against design ex-
amples to test their validity, then re-examined for generality.
The example systems utilized in this study were the Apollo
Block II G&N, SCS and Telecommunications systems. These were re-
designed utilizing the mission constraints and considerations of
the 1975 space station, assuming that similar functional require-
ments would exist for that mission. In relating mission function
to equipment satisfaction, various existing techniques were ex
amined for usefulness, such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), Functional Flow and Fault Tree. While these are more or
less useful, a simple direct approach was sought that would be
useful to personnel at various levels of program involvement.
The technique developed utilizes Boolean notation and permits the
direct translation from mission function to specific design, and
is useful from conceptual phase to equipment acquisition. This
analysis technique focrses attention on the critical functions,
or "weak links", and 'can be E-ttremely detailed, which is useful
for the designer, or can be greatly simplified to present an
easily understandable "quick look" for management. Additionally,
the impact of commonality, redundancy or changes in equipment can
be readily identified with this technique.
In satisfying the requirements of a mission, the designer
will have a certain amount of latitude. Normally many trade-offs
are made in arriving at a design, but rarely are these trade-offs
documented in such a way that they can be intelligently or effec-
tively reviewed and discussed. To circumvent this, a straight-
forward method was developed for documenting the rationale for a
decision, the IFM matrix. Examples are shown elsewhere, but
briefly it consists of a list of independent mission considerations
which are weighted as to their importance concerning the problem
at hand. The candidate problem solutions (or designs) are examined
and scored using each mission consideration in turn. The resulting
IFM matrix causes the problem solver (designer) to develop a ration-
ale for his solution, ouviates the omission of.important considera-
tions in the trade-off, and furnishes a record and basis for review
and discussion. For most trade-off studies the same basic list of
considerations are useful, but of course the matrix should be tailor-
ed to the problem at hand	 41
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The establishment of the program and mission groundrules,
subsequent identification of specific design oriented criteria,
systems analysis to relate mission functions to equipment satis-
faction and a technique to optimize equipment design are the basic
requirements for enhancing IFM. To be effective, these groundrules,
criteria and analytical techniques must be developed prior to solidi-
fying equipment specifications and available for usage at preliminary
and critical design reviews. The IFM requirements and expected usage
or purpose of IFM analysis should be identified in the Request for
Proposal (RFP). Further, the RFP should direct the Contractor to
identify, in his proposal, how the IFM analysis will be conducted
and the unexpected depth of analysis.
Sample System Analysis
An analysis of the Apollo Block II Guidance and Navigation,
Stabilization and Control System and Telecommunication System was
conducted at the start of this study for the purpose of familiariza-
tion as well as providing data on the functional and hardware char-
acteristics, such as redundancy and commonality, pertinent to the
subject of in-flight maintenance on future manned space programs.
For the sake of maintaining a relatively straight forward ex-
ample, the analysis was limited to critical functions of the system;
i.e., those functions which in the event of a failure, would impact
^r; on the safety of the crew in any way.
	
A most effective tool in
accomplishing both the objective of familiarization as well as
analyzing the system redundancy was to express each of the functions
in a Boolean Algebra equation where each of the terms represents
°. a unique piece of hardware in the system, essential to satisfaction
of the function or any redundant paths. 	 The functions analyzed
were attitude control, thrust vector control and attitude reference
alignment for the G&C (CAN and SCS combined) and spacecraft-to-
ground re-aging and spacecraft-to-rendezvous.vehicle ranging for
telecommunications.
It was concluded from the analysis that (1) the Boolean
approach was an efficient and effective means of tying hardware to
function, particularly for such means as Failure Mode Effects
, Analysis; (2) there were no single failures in G&C or telecommuni-
cations that could result in loss of the crew, and (3) on 	 apparent
weakness in the design was use of common switches for redundant
paths in the telecommunications system.
In the area of hardware -haracteristics the major concern was
'^ to determine the extent of commonality because of its impact on such
i-
R
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key items as spares weight, the malfunction isolation scheme,
opportunity for cannibalization, etc. To illustrate, some SCS
system commonality figures are provided and are representative
of the other electronic systems. Of approximately 30 different
circuit types in the SCS, the following five are the only ones
presenting any significant degree of commonality:
Transistor Enable/Disable Circuit
	 29
AC Amplifier (400 cps)	 42
DC Amplifier	 12
Demodulator	 26
Drive Amplifiers	 16
Even greater commonality exists at the smaller piece part
level, however, for remove/replace repair, it is practically use-
less. Even the level of hardware listed above is too small. The
interconnections for remove/replace of such components would be
prohibitive, as well as the complexity of the fault isolation sys-
tem. Our trade-offs indicate that providing R/R commonality at
such a level would be uneconomic.
Therefore, it seems logical that for the Space Station
remove/replace type of maintenance the next larger level of hard-
ware is far more practical; this could best be called hardware
commonality at the functional level, svlh as attitude error display
electronics or accelerometer electronics. Commonality rarely ex-
ceeds 5 of a kind at this level, nevertheless it does exist and
every attempt to maximize it should be made.
To conclude the hardware; analysis, the following data is pro-
vided for comparison with the redesign characteristics later. The
system weights are 582 pounds for Guidance and Control, and 243
pounds for telecommunications while power consumptions are 1052
and 468 watts respectively. The total systems failure rate with
all systems operating continuously was on the order of 1 failure
per 18 days or 20 failures per year. A rough estimate of spares
resupply weight, with an average black box weight of 20 pounds,
was 400 pounds per year, or nearly half the weight of the total
system.
Redesign
f
This section takes the systems
lates their design into an in-flight
Station '75. A basic assumption was
required on the Space Station as wer
tionally reducing the design to more
analyzed earlier and extrapo-
maintainable system for Space
that the same functions are
e required on Apollo, inten-
of a restructuring and
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repackaging job than a true redesign. The idea was to take Apollo
electronics capable of doing the job and reconfiguring it in such
a way that changes or additions in function would not impact the
basic approach arrived at in the study.
The component selection for the redesign will use essentially
today's technology. The key decision to be made was whether or not
to extensively utilize Large Scale Integrated Circuits (LSI); the
decision was made to use micro logic and hybrid micro circuits,
Medium Scale Integrated Circuits (MSI) where they are available,
and LSI only as available now for memory and computer applications.
LSI is being applied principally where a large number of circuit
functions of the same type are needed such as computers. The pack-
aging scheme in this study was chosen'to provide for LSI in the
future, should it become more extensively used.
Very briefly, the existing Apollo telecommunications is com-
posed of a communications link at VHF frequencies for earth orbital,
entry and LM/EVA communication plus backup ranging capability, while
a second link at S-Band frequencies provides the same functions as
well as lunar phase communications where VHF i; inadequate. The
S-Band system is also essential to the data transmission function
which comprises the remainder of the telecommunications components.
For the redesign this system was left unchanged in function.
The G&N on Apollo provides the sole source of guidance and
the prime source o.: vehicle control commands. 	 The SCS provides a
backup source of contrei, all the final--stage driving electronics
plus hand controls and displays.
	
For the redesign the backup SCS
control capability has been eliminated as well as the displays and
controls redundancy.
	 Two redundant "G&N only" systems were provided
for the following reasons:	 (1) the space station RFP .requires that
a single compartment must be able to be isolated in the event of
catastrophe and capability provided in the remaining cbmpartments
to safely live and take corrective action, or return to Earth;
(2) two identical systems maximizes commonality and cannibaliza-
tion; and (3) permits complete power down of a "down" system while
complete capability of vehicle control is provided from the alter-
}`
aM, nate system.
The major effort. in this study for in-flight main':enance was
g focused on the electronics components rather than sensors, antennas
and such.	 These components will also require maintenance but will
be more a problem of securing and aligning rather than packaging.
s0
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The initial criteria for configuring or grouping the elec-
tranics was optimum fault isolation. This was defined as having
minimum test points and minimum fault isolation system complexity.
This approach maximized the functional hardware level commonality
mentioned earlier.	 After a first cut using this criteria the re-
sulting configuration was then modified to conform with all other
perLi.nent constraints such as packaging design, environment,
cooling methods, interconnections scheme, etc. The final con-
figuration resulted in a total of 61 lowest replaceable units
(LRU) per G&C system or a total of 122 for the two systems on the
station. Of the 61 total per system, 46 were electronic module
mounted in a cabinet and varying in size from the equivalent of
a 4" x 5" board to 10 boards. The resultant total of the tele-
communications system was 199 modules, the majority of which were
a 2 board size.
The test points required to isolate the 61. components of the
G&C were 228 including all means of measurement such as CMC digital
word readout, voltage checks and caution and warning test points.
Four new stimuli were required. The total per entire space sta-
tion then was 456 test points and 8 new stimuli. A corresponding
estimate of telecommunications test points amounted to approxi-
mately 500 test points and 12 additional stimuli required.
One prime candidate for commonality that became apparent in
the redesign was power supplies. If the power supplies were
standardized, as considerable Martin Marietta study and testing
has indicated is feasible, the function of the 25 or so different
power supples in the redesigned systems could be performed by
.just- a few cifferent types of supplies, thereby permitting inter-
changeability and reducing spares requirements from a minimum of
25 to 2 or 3. These standardized supplies will satisfy a variety
of power requirements without compromising efficiency.
The combined failure rate of the redesigned system was esti-
mated at 1 failure per 26.7 days or approximately one per month.
From a total weight of-G&C and telecommunications of 1231 pounds
and a per module weigh: of 4 pounds, the resultant resupply weight
was 48 pounds/year or 1/25 of the total systems weight; consider-
ably better than the 400 pounds for the original system., It was
assumed the telecommunications and one G&C.system was operating
continuously.
r
f
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Electronic Packaging
-
In order to facilitate maintenance, the packaging should be
modular. To minimize costs at virtually all 'Levels from design
through installation .ind maintenance, the packaging should be
standardized.
Trade-off studies indicated that a standardized packaging
approach with somewhat flexible module size and forced-air
cooling would best satisfy the mission considerations for the
space station as weighted in this summary, a weighting that
of course is open to discussion. An embodiment of some of
these ideas may be seen in the engineering mockup, which re-
presents a truncated cabinet.
A trade-off involving module size indicated that a module
may be built having the equivalent of from one to ten printed
circuit (PC) boards without losing the advantages of_•
 standardiza-
tion, where a PC board of 4 by 5 inch size will hold up to 50
integrated circuit flat packs. The latter is the nominal size
for a module, but the flexibility was found to be important in
reducing malfunction isolation complexity.
The cabinet design formulated for housing the electronic
modules incorporates features such as easy access for R/R, modular
cabling, forced convection cooling, and accommodation for various
module sizes, including shielded modules.
Several connectors were selected for consideration on the
basis of this study, which encompasses a literature search and a
vendor survey. It was felt advisable to choose a packaging and
connector approach which would be economic if and when the environ-
mental conditions in the space station or base are no longer adverse.
But for the present, the recommendation is to utilize commercial
connectors, when available, that employ interfacial seals isolating
the contacts from each other. For rack and panel or PC board con-
nectors, the addition of an elastometric Jsqueegie or pin seal is
recommended. All of these can utilize ;silicone grease for addi-
tional protection if necessary. Several types of connectors are
demonstrated en the mockup.
Test and Checkout
The test and checkout functions are a prime consideration in
maintenance and will be found interwoven with virtually every
other aspect of the study.
I
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In examining test and checkout requirements and philosophy,
I rr.df -off , ; tudi.es were made, the literature: was studied, and key
1wr:;onnu 1. from recent or ongoing programs were consulted; notable:
lamonf; them.: ware: Computerized Automatic Ground Equipment- (CAGE),
On-Board Checkout System (OCS), Multi-Parameter Display (MPD) and
BU ILL-111 Checkout (BIC) .
While a test and checkout system must perform the three pin -
r_ip41 tasks of critical failure monitoring, failure isolation. and
system checkout, the primary concern was with failure isolation.
This study performed an in-depth analysis and redesign of the
Block II Apollo G&N, SCS and Telecommunications systems, so the
trade-off studies on failure isolation systems deal primarily
with those examples.
As it is not practical to design equipment with 100% pro-
bability of no failure over a ten-year life span, some degree of
system repair will be necessary. For this study, system repair
was limited to remove and replace (R/R); therefore, the primary
emphasis was on determining the optimum type of malfunction iso-
lation system for the space station.
A very versatile and complex malfunction isolation system
will result in a high confidence of isolating a failure, and will
place few constraints on the design of the systems to be tested,
but there are penalities in the size and complexity of the system,
the operator training requirements, and the total system relia-
bility.
A preferable approach is to force systems designs that are
testable; for instance, structuring the system and sizing the
modules to minimize the number of test points and external sti-
muli as well as carefully cnoo:•ing these test points to provide
meaningful and understandab'le data. This design for testability
has the dual advantage of simplifying the test equipment while
increasing the probability that a malfunction can be isolated;
the Space Base Study issued by NASA (1969) indicates that the
desired probability is 95% to 98%.
System verification, both for repaired systems and replace-
ment (new) systems, must be provided, and requires some different
test procedures, test points and stimuli. Hardware sharing be-
tween this function and malfunction isolation is indicated aad
should be easily realized if the test system is built around a
general purpose computer. For new systems,- verification in a
house spacecraft is recommended before installation in the space
station.
4.
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A trade-off study wa; •performed to find the optimum malfunction
isolation system complexity fur a particular system, the redesigned
Guidance and Navigation System. This system was redesigned to fa-
y	 cil.itate test and checkout. Additionally, emphasis was placed on
the signal processing electronics, not on sensors, control and dis-
play devices, and actuators. For this particular example, a medium
complexity malfunction isolation system was chosen as optimum, and
the trade-oi` process utilizing the I Fl matrix is documented in the
body of this report,
When the totality of electronic systems in the space station
is considered, a reasonably sophisticated test and checkout- will
probably be indicated; however, if all systems are designed for
testability, the peripheral equipment complexity will. be reduced
considerably.
Areas for Additional Study
During; the course of our study, it became evident- that certain
facet's of the electronics maintainability problem should be studied,
but could not be within this study's scope. Some of these are as
follows:
1) Sensors - calibration, maintenance and checkout.
2) Displays and controls - in-flight maintenance.
3) IFM experiment - to test methods, concepts and hardware.
4) Checkc_.^ and malfunction isolation - further definition
of requirements, for the totality of the electronics sys-
tems in the space station.
5) Interprogram commonality - for instance, Space Shuttle,
Space Base electronics commonality.
r6
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1 11 . 0101"CTIVES AND APPROACH
The primary objective of the In-Flight Maintenance (II'M)
y	 .atud y was to develop criteria and guidelines that could be used
to enhance in-flight maintenance as related to electronics sys-
Lems for Space Station'75. Another objective was to identify
typical equipment type and subsystems that are candidates for
commonality, and finally, to recommend techniques for controlling;
those design and development areas that have a significant impact
on in-flight maintenance and extended mission life.
Technical Approach
The first step in meeting the objectives set forth was to
establish mission ground rules and assumptions for the space
station-space base complex. In this, aid was provided by NASA
personnel, but in some cases it was found necessary to generate
new and specific ground rules for the Study.
Once these ground rules and assumptions were established,
it was possible to proceed with an analysis of some existing
hardware with the intention of redesigning this hardware to allow
in-flight maintenance. This redesign effort, in turn, was uti-
tized as a vehicle to help in the formulation of criteria, and to
test and retest these criteria as the program progressed.
The hardware items that were chosen for analysis and re-
design were the Block II Apollo G&N, SCS and Telecommunications
systems. It is presumed that the bulk of the functions performed
by these systems will also be necessary on the space station,
therefore utilizing these existing systems gained the advantage
of a concrete example and historical data with which to compare
attributes of the redesigned system.
During the early part of the selected systems analysis
those operational and hardware areas were identified that have
the greatest impact on in-flight maintenance and extended mission
life. Emphasis was placed on those hardware items that promised
the greatest payoff in helping meet the study objectives; examin-
ing them for possible packaging levels, commonality candidates
and system/mission erfect in the event of failure.
In the redesign effort, the intent was to identify what de-
cisions and information are necessary to control design and de-
^•elopment in order to ensure the desired result; i.e., the ac-
quisition of a spacecraft electronics system that can be main-
tained in a space environment. As the various problems were
M111-2
co nsidvred a concerted effort was made to document the thinking,	 •
the I lade-Off study, aA all other considerations examined in
arriving .it decisions. Some of this documentation will be found
in later sections of the report.
'fhe redesigned system was used as a vehicle to test the cri-
teria developed, the degree of commonality realizable, and a possi-
ble packaging scheme. It is recognized that the list or criteria
is not exhaustive, and that the criteria will undergo change with
time, _just as they did during the study, The method of generating
useful criteria is more important than the list itself, and hope-
fully this will be evident from the results as presented in this
report,
r0
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IV. SAMPLE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
An analysis of the Apollo Block II Guidance and Navigation
'	 System, Stabilization and Control System, and Telecommunications
System was performed at the onset of this study. The objective
was two-fold. First, it provided a means of becoming familiar
with the electronic systems which later in the study were to be
redesigned for in-flight maintenance. Secondly, it provided
"guinea p'.g" flight qualified operational space hardware as close
in function to the space programs of the future as is currently
available. This second objective entailed analysis of the sys-
tem from a number of different aspects with the primary purpose
of singling out the hardware and functional characteristics es-
pecially significant in designing a system that requires in-flight-
maintenance.
Some of those specific characteristics that were considered
pertinent and merited inclusion in this report on in-flight main-
tenance are: redundancy required and available, and the use and
degree of commonality. The 'iardware weight, power consumption
and failure rate data is also furnished for comparison later with
the redesign configuration.
Functional Description
This analysis is not concerned with all funct,i ,-.,ns of the
three systems. Only those considered of a critical nature are
discussed in any detail as they comprise nearly all the hardware
in these threia systems, including all redundant paths.
A critical fui•tction for purposes of this study, as for most
Apollo studies (NR, 1968b)*, is a systems function or capability
that, if lost, may result in loss of the crew. A single failure
that can cause such loss is a Category I, or sometimes referred
to as Criticality 1, failure. Conversely, a Category II failure
is one resulting in abort of the mission but not loss of the crew.
To maintain a relatively straightforward example Category II
failure effects are'not discussed in this report.
The functions of the Guidance and Navigation System and
Stabilization and Control system are virtually inseparable. They
are: (1) attitude cor..trol, (2) thrust vector control, and
(3) attitude reference . alignment. The telecommunication functions
that could be constru. ,.!d as critical are (1) spacecraft to ground
coi;nnunication, (2) spacecraft to ground ranging, and (3) space-
c1laft to rendezvous vehicle ranging. The criteria for de ormining
NJ? = Abbreviation. for North American Roct-yell
i	 a
',gsM.
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which functions are critical and which are not was based on a
luv)wl.edge of the three systems and the Apollo Lunar missions on
which thc N, are used. As the mission changes so does the critical-
iLy of some of the functions. For this study no attempt was made
to finitely determine a given mission. Rather, a conservative
approach was taken and any function that could be construed as
critical across a range of different missions was included in the
analysis as being critical.
Considerable thought was given to find some way of quickly
yet- thoroughly becoming familiar with the system and hardware re-
quired to perform the above functions. 	 A method was employed
which appeared to serve the purpose and had the feature of allow-
ing expression of the system function directly in terms of the
actual hardware involved.	 The method utilizes a single Boolean
algebra equation for each of the systems' functions.	 The terms
of the equation represent unique pieces of hardware required to
satisfy the function or its redundant paths, if any. 	 The equa-
tions for those functions identified earlier are provided in
Table IV-1.	 The base of knowledge for development of these equa-
tions were the following references: 	 NR, 1969; Honeywell, 1968b;
MIT Schematics; NR, 1969d; Collins Radio, 1966; NR, 1968c, as well
considerable background and experience in the design, development
and operational utilization of the Apollo subsystems, particularly
Guidance and Control.	 The explanation of the G&C function equa-
tion symbols are found in Table IV-2 and Telecommunications in
Table IV-3.
	
The equations of Table IV-1 will be discussed in more
detail under Failure Mode Effects.
It is quite possible to employ the same approach for any
function of any system desired.	 It is most useful, however, for
critical functions where it quickly illustrates the required re-
dundancy, or lack of it. 	 There is no reason why this Boolean
approach could not be utilized at various hardware levels below
that used in this example for more thorough tracking of mission
to ha- :.rare.
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TABLE IV-2 - G&C SYMBOL EXPLANATION
AD
 = A/D & D/A logic with associated timing and control (CL
AG
 = PGNCS accelerometer and associated timing and control
AH
 = EMS accelerometer and associated electronics
B = Command module computer (CMC)
C 1 2 = Rotation Controllers 1 and 2, respectively
D = Functions of Gyro Display Coupler (GDC) and Attitude Set
Control Panel (ASCP)
EC1,2,3 = Functions contained in the Electronic Control Assembly(ECA)
E 
	 = Optical Subsystem related electronics
%	 = SPS Engine
G1 2 = SCS Gyro Assemblies 1 and 2 (GA's)
I l 2 = FDAI 1 and 2 and related electronics in Electronic Dis-
'	 play Assembly (EDA)
JN
	= Nurmally used Jet Solenoids
JN ' = Redundant Jet Solenoids
K1 2	 Display and Keyboard Units 1 and 2 (DSKY's)
MN
	= MSFN and ground computer facilities
0 = Optical Subassembly
P122 = Function of Gimbal Position Display (GP/FPI) and assoc.
 electronics in EDA
Q = RCS driver functions of the Reaction Jet and Engine On-Off
Control Assembly (RJEC)
QB
 = Logic in RJEC related to PGNCS attitude control
QS
 = Logic in RJEC related to SCS attitude control
SB,M = PGNCS and SCS mode switching, respectively
V	 = Redundant functions of the Thrust Vector Servo Assembly1,2	 (TVSA) and related SPS engine actuators
iIV-5
TABLE IV-3 TELECOMM SYMBOL EXPLANATION
AC
	 52)3	 = Audio Celter Electronic Modules
AA^,^	 2	 3 =>	 >
Audio Control Panel (Vol. switch, etc.)
ANO	
- S-Band Omni Antenna
ANS	 = S-Band High Gain Antenna
ANV1 2	 = VHF Antennas (1800
 apart)
ARR	 = Rendezvous Radar Antenna
DRG	 = Digital Ranging Generator
E L 2	 = Earphones
M1 2	 = Microphones
PA1 2	 =
S-Banco Power Amplifiers
PCM	 = Pulse Code Modulation Equipment
PMP	 = Premodulation Processor
RLM	 = Rendezvous Radar - LM
RT	= Rendezvous Radar Transponder - CSM
RU DL	
= Updata Link Ranging Select
SAS	 - S-Band Antenna Switch
SAV	 = VHF Antenna Switch
SCE	 = Signal Conditioning Equipment
SPA	 = S=Band Power Amplifier Switch
SR	= Ranging Select Switch
SRT	 - Rendezvous Radar Transponder Switch
SS	= S-Band Transponder Switch
VA 31 B	
= VHF AM Trans/Rcv. Switches
SVR	 = VHF Ranging Switch
TS1,2	 = S-Band Triplexer
TV1 2	 = VHF Triplexer Bandpass Filters
TXSIjCS1,2 5-band Transmitter/Receiver Electronics
T
xv
RCV Transmitter/Receiver Electronics1 ^ 2VHF
USBE =	 Unified S-Bald Equipment
VHF =	 Very High Frec ,uency Comm	 Equipment
r0
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Fai lure Mode E'f.fect:s, Analysis
In the course of this study a review of several Failure
Mode 1-:fl'ects Analyses (FMEA) on Apollo was corducted (NR, 19681);
NR, 1969a, NR, 1.9691); Honeywell, 1965) . No significanti.cant conclu-
sions could be drawn from them other than that there were no
basic disagreements. Therefore, a detailed part by part FMEA
is not discussed further in this report. What appears more use-
ful and instructive is a brief but similar P alysis at a func-
tional level commensurate with the Boolean c;pressions in Table
IV-1. Before looking at any functions in particular it is °_m-
portant to recognize that since all the equations represent crew
safety functions, complete redundancy must be available to
guarantee crew safety in the event of a Single failure. Examin-
ing the first equation of Table IV-1, attitude control; it is
possible, for the purpose of determining adequacy of redundancy,
to simplify that equation by grouping together all terms ANDED
together in an expression and assigning to it some general let-
ter designator such as a, b, or c. The simplified equation be-
comes:
	
RCS	 dis-	 control att. ref.
	
Jets	 plays	 elect. subsystems
It is apparent that redundancy for this function is quite
adequate. What is not apparent from the equation is the avail-
ability, in terms of time, of the redundant paths. This requires
more detailed investigation of the operational use of the systems
involved. On Apollo where no maintenance was planned, alternate
or redundant circuits were, for all practical purposes, imme-
diately available upon failure of the path in use. Switchover
was performed manually by the crew.
The thrust vector control equation reduces to:
a (bb++-c) Cd+e+f (g+h]
SPS	 TVC	 Control Elect.
Eng. Elect.
In this equation some inconsistencies are apparent. The weak
link is "a", or Gri in the original equation, which represents
the SPS Engine thrust chamber. This is, in fact, a single poiwt
failure on Apollo and is recognized as such. Also of interest in
.
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the above equation is the triple redundant control electronics
for the TVC loop. This appears unnecessarily redundant in light
of the single point failure in the engine nozzle. It would be
premature, of cGurse, to eliminate a control path without con-
sidering first the operational aspects of so time-critical a
function as TVC. The value of the Boolean expression, however,
is that it points immediately to an area ofo^ ssible over-design
and cunsequenLly possible simplification.
Reducing the attitude reference alignment equation of Table
IV -1 results in:
(att.cont.) (
^'b
Att. Determination
The aLtiLude control function required for attitude reference
alignment has already been found a lequaLe, therefore, the entire
function is redundant. It should bL pointed out, in looking back
to the original equation, that the SCS attitude determination ca-
pability is dependent on one term, M, which is not always available.
From Table IV-2 this is the Manned Space Flight Network and com-
puting facility. This path would not provide adequate redundancy
for a program without continuous or at least frequent ground com-
munication.
The ground to spacecraft communication function equation can
he simplified sev ,ral times resulting in:
1-
V11F S- Audio Link
Band
which appears sufficiently redundant.
The spacecraft-to-ground ranging equation is essentially the
-Band equipment:
a(b + c)d(e + f) (g +h)i(j + k) (1 + m)
which has three single point failures, a, d and i. All three of
these,looking at the original equation and Table IV-3, are switches.
This points out a characteristic weakness in telecommunications.
Switches were originally neglected in redundancy design on Apollo
as being non-fail devices. Later in the program the failure pos-
sibility of a switch was recognized and'some redesign was performed
iTV-8
to alleviate the more critical redundant circuits but a number
of weak links still exist.
The final equation is the spacecraft-to-rendezvous-vehicle
ran;;ing capability, which reduces very simply to (a + b). The
two redundant paths are the Command Module VHF ranging; and the
Lunar Module Rendezvous Radar system.
Hardware Analisis
One important area in examining the hardware of the three
subsystems was the degree to which commonality existed. In de-
signing for optimum maintainability the greater the number of
common items used in a system the simpler will be the malfunction
isolation scheme, the fewer different spares required, and the
more cannibalization can be utilized.
The analysis has shown that there are certain general types
of circuits which occur repeatedly in either the PGNCS or SCS.
Those occuring most commonly and the approximate quantities are:
SCS
Transistor Enablel^isable Circuit 	 29
AC Amplifier (400 cps)	 42
DC Amplifier	 42
Demodulators	 26
Drive Amplifiers	 16
G&N
AC Amplifier (800 cps)	 53
Transistor Gate Circuits 	 184
Schmitt Trigger	 16
Output Drivers	 16
Buffer Amplifiers	 13
Push-pull Amplifiers	 9
Center-Tapped Transformers 	 22
These figures do not consider the computer, IMU or individual
NL R gates used in the logic. Commonality is found to occur in
quantum type steps rather than distributed in any continuous
manner. To illustrate, note that there are 184 similar transistor
gate circuits used but the next highest level of commonality is in
the region of + 40-50 AC amplifiers, then a jump to roughly 30 ea
enable/disable demodulation circuits. Beyond this point circuit
commonality drops abruptl! and is typically a maximum of 3 for the
.
ri
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SCS and a maximum of 5 for the PGNCS, both of these correspond to
'	 the number of identical or nearly identical channels in a system.
Out of a total of 30 circuit types for the SCS then, only the 5
riven above exhibit a high degree of commonality. Similarly for
the PGNCS, only 7 of 44 circuit types exhibit a high degree of
commonality. Also, 7 SCS circuits are unique as well as 7 of the
PGN(:S circuit types used only once. Further, many of the circuits
wit1 ch leave been grouped together are actually associated with
III)lque coupling; network6 not common to other circuits in the group.
The commonality in the communication system has not been dis-
cussed in detail because in general, commonality is exhibited to
an even lesser degree than the other two systems. One obvious
reason for this is that the "black boxes" in the System, though
contracted by Collins Radio, were each built by a different vendor
which automatically reduces commonality. In addition, the circuit
paths that are potentially common are generally LZF circuits and
consequently tuned to specific and different frequencies.
The analysis was carried to a level of the smallest reason-
able module level, typically a'single amplifier circuit. It is
at this level, and lower, that substantial commonality can be
found for some circuits. However, this level is considered to
•	 be unsuitable for madularization for the following reasons:
1. This level of commonality would result in a module that
is physically too small and may be only a portion of a
chip in 1975.
2. Such a low level off: modularization would result in a
proliferation of interconnections/connectors severely
degrading reliability.
3. Troubleshooting and fault isolation is impractical to
this level and would result in unnecessarily complex
checkout equipment.
4. Low level commonality constraints would impact design
efficiency and result in increased power usage, compro-
mise of operating characteristics, etc.
5. Commonality would not be achieved to a significant de-
gree; there would still remain many small, unique cir-
cuits.
6. It would be impractical to place low level commonality
constraints on multiple contractors. Exceptions would
.tend to become unmanageable.
I0
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In summary then, current Apollo hardware commonality is not
very practical for remove-replace at the level at which it is most
prevalent. Another approach to commonality is presented in Table
IV-4. This could best be described as functional commonality, or
the grouping of electronic components associated with a specific
system function where that function is repeated several times in
the system. For example, attitude display electronics, which are
identical for all three attitude axes; pitch, yaw and roll. It
is apparent from the table that there is a commonality at this
level throughout all three systems. It does not prevail to the
degree that the lower level hardware commonality does, but several
factors should be considered. The package is inherently larger,
therefore, is easier to handle and easier to remove-replace. Re-
pair at this level could easily be restricted to remove-replace
rather than the soldering techniques required for repair or re-
placement of the lower level components. Packaging for functional
commonality also minimizes the fault isolation circuitry required.
With function-oriented packages a few test points can generally
isolate all elements of a particular function, as illustrated later
in Section VI.
To conclude the summary of existing equipment, the subsystem
failure rates are submitted in Table IV-5 and weight and power data
in Table IV-6. The failure rate figures are specification values
and do not reflect actual system failure history. What little data
is available at present would indicate that these figures are con-
servative and system reliability has proved to be better than ex-
pected. No attempt was made to document probabilities of success
or crew safety (Ps) from these failure rates since it depends en-
tirely on the duty cycle. Assuming the worst case; all systems
operating continuously, which is not far from Apollo Lunar mission
conditions, the system failures can be briefly summarized for G&N
as .901 Failure/1000 hours of 1 Failure/46 days; for SCS 1.287
Failures/1000 hours, or 1 Failure/32.5 days; and for telecommuni-
cations .14 Failure/1000 hours, or 1 Failure 297 days. For all
three systems together the failure rate is 1 Failure/18 days or
20 Failures/year.
Looking to Table IV-6 and using the total weight of 865 pounds
for all three systems,,dividing it by the total number of components,
44 2
 the per component weight averages out to 20 pounds. Based on
the failure rate of 20 per year this results in a resupply weight of
400 pounds per year. This is nearly half the weight of the system.
The estimate is gross, of course, in that it assumes all components
of like reliability and no change in reliability with time. Never-
theless, it does provide a ball-park figure for the maintenance pen-
alties associated with Apollo Block II Electronic systems.
w
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Component
G&N
PEA
1' ` A
C U
D SKY
SCS
EDA
to EC
TV SA
GA
FDAI
Rot. Cont.
HEADSETS
AUDIO CENTER
PREMOD PROCESSOR
VHF AM
POWER AMP
TABLE IV-4 - FUNCTIONAL PATH COMMONALITY IV-11
G&C
Functional Path
Accel. Electronics
Binary Switch
DC Diff. Amp. d PVR
AC Di f f . Amp. & PV R
PIPA Cal. Module
Gimbal Servo Amps
OSS Motor Drive Elect.
ISS 800 11i, 17, 1'wr. Supplies
ISS 800 11z, 57 Pwr. Supplies
Quadrant Selector
MSA & Quad. Rejection
Read Counter
D/A Converter,
Error Angle Counter & Logic
Coarse System
Rate Display Elect.
Att. Error Display Elect.
Att. Display Elect.
Gimbal Position Display Elect.
RCS Driver Elect.
TVC Elect.
Gyro Elect.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Earphone
Microphone
Microphone Amplifiers
Earphone Amplifiers
Voice Operated Switch
Biphase Modulator
Bias Amplifier
Transmitter (less osc.)
Receiver (less osc.)
Fowe-- Supplies
uan
4
4
3
3
3
4
2
3
5
5
5
5
3
2
6
6
2
16
4
6
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
z
O er.
(147`1',	 1.967; Carpenter,	 1969)
IMU	 b	 11 11 1A	 I;l c.c.	 Assy. 129.0
II SA 110. 0
CDU 155.0
C)S S
CI)U 97.0
PSA 77.0
Optical Assy. 94.0
Misr..
DSKY 2.3
D&C 2.3
Computer 235
Total 9017
Standby
10.2
6.3
60.5
77.0
0
TABLE IV-5
IV- I;^
FAILURI: RATE SUMMARY
Failure Rate (,) x10-6
SCS (NR, 1968a)
RJ EC 41.5
IXA 54.7
TVSA 57.0
EDA 201.0
GDC 144.0
GA 1 197.5
Gt. 2 197.5
FDAI 1 143.6
FDAI 2 143.6
GP/FPI 48.8
ASCP 24.3
Rot.	 Cont.	 1 15.0
Rot. Cont. 2 15.0
Trans. Cont. 3.5
Total 1287.0
TELECOM MICATIONS (Carpenter, 1969)
VHF
VHF Trip lexer .1
VHF AM Trans/Rev 1.5.2
Digital Ranging Gen. 17.8
S-Band
USBE PM Transponder 19.4
Power Amplifier 12.1
Premodulation Processor 6.6
Mi sc.
FM Transmitter 6.8
PCM Telemetry 1.1
Data Storage Equip. 45.0
Audio Center 5.1
UDL 10.7
CTE
SCE
 N ^A
Rend. Radar Transponder N/A
Total 140.5
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TABLE IV-6
WEIGHT & POWER.
SCS (NR, 1968a; Honeywell, 1968a)
Co;ulronc:nt Weight	 (lbs) Max.	 Power (Watts)
115 VAC 28 VDC
GA	 1 22	 1/2 35 60	 (30)r after
GA 2 22	 1/2 35 60	 (30); warmup
c;0C 25 60 50
NDA 24 35 50
KCA 16 1.4 14
R,I I.0 20	 1.12 4 2
IVSA 12	 1/2 22 ; 3	 (peak- 60)
ASGf' 3 1/2 - -
TC 5	 1/2 - -
RC 1 10 - -
RC 2 10 - -
FDAI	 i I - -
FDAI 2 11 - -
G11 / FP1 3 - -
Total. 197 lbs	 205 watts 249 watts
G&N (MIT, 1967)
Component Weight (1bs) Operate Pwr-28 VDC, Stdby Pwr -28 VDC
CMC 70 110 10
CDU 36
PSA 50
IMU 42 1/2 287 43
Optics 56 123 -
Misc.(12 items) 130 25 -
Total 385 lbs 545 watts 53 watts
TELECOMMNICATIONS (COLLINS P.ADIO, 1966)
Max. Power
Component Weight (lbs) 115 VAC 28 VDC
Audio Center 7.9 - 14.0 watts
PMP 11.3 - 8.5
V1iF AM Tx/Rx 13.5 - 28.0
VHF Triplexer 1.7 - -
S-Band :.quip. 28.0 34 2.4
S-Band Pwr Amp 32.0 180 5.0
PCM 44 21 2.2.
CTE 20 - 20
Up Data Link 21 - 9
SCE 33 - 35
R. R. Xponder 14 - 84
DSE 40 35 -
Dig. Rnging Gen. 7 - 25
Total	 I 2834 1bs	 270	 Watts 233.1	 Watts
TOTAL ALI	 3	 $65
	
lbs	 1.5 KW
r6
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V.	 IFM REQUIREMENTS
Appro);.imately fifty studies and reports related to main-
tenance, reliability and electronic design were reviewed during
the first six weeks of this study. It was determined that exis-
tent criteria pertaining to maintenance either tended to be human
factors oriented or merely constitute mission constraints and
considerations. Historically, equipment designers have often ig-
110red human factors critera. In addition they generally are not
mission oriented. They need design oriented criteria. A forcing
function is required to assure that performance requirements de-
veloped in equipment specifications are initially compatible with
mission requirements and remain compatible as equipment design
and mission definition are refined. The experience of our study
nam corroborates these statements.
In order to develop specific design criteria for In-Flight
Maintenance (IFM) it was necessary to first develop and refine the
mission constraints and operational assumptions. General assump-
tions and constraints such as the resupply interval of 90 days
and a high humidity shirtsleeve environment were identified at
contract go-ahead. More specific items such as remove-replace
only, and no powered disconnection of modules were identified
during the first three months of the study. A complete list of the
ground rules and assumptions is provided later in this section.
The development of mission ground rules not only permitted
the development of criteria, but also served to identify and de-
fine salient points to study. For example, establishing that
maintenance would be limited to the remove-replace level identi-
fied the need to concentrate on fault isolation at that level.
It was concluded that program and mission ground rules should be
documented and continuously refined while serving as a baseline
requirements document until the equivalent of a mission flight
plan is generated.
At the time the flight plan and resulting operational re-
quirements are identified, design oriented criteria can be de-
veloped that will assist in translating from a mission function
to specific equipment requirements. However, it is still impera-
tive that the document used as a baseline for requirements,
whether called Mission Ground Rules or other, be maintained and
reviewed to assure compatibility between the ultimate equipment 	 y
definition and the functional purpose of the equipment, namely,
x mission satisfaction.
Y
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As the design criteria was developed it became apparent that
pacicapging design is a key element in achieving an in-Flight main-
tenance capability; another key element is the capability to fault
i_sol.aLe. The significance of commonality and redundancy at remove-
replace level and at module element level was also recognized.
Criteria for each of these four areas was developed. These criteria
summarized below are documented later in this section.
Packaging - 21 items
Malfunction Detection, Isolation
and Verification - 20 items
Redundancy - 9 items
Commonality - 3 items
In establishing the ground rules and criteria discussed above
two types of analysis were found necessary to enhance in-flight
maintenance and extend mission life: 1) A systems analysis that
relates mission function to :specific equipment satisfaction, and
2) A design analysis to optimize design within given constraints,
such as electrical power and resupply weight. Various techniques
for documenting a systems analysis were examined. It was found
necessary to first identify, in depth, the purpose or objectives
associated with a system analysis. Hence, criteria for analysis
were developed. A complete list- and discussion follows later.
With this criteria as a guide a method for the systems
analysis identified above was developed. This technique, called
a Functional Loop and Alternate Ways (FLAW) analysis, is discussed
in . lil later, together with an example.
The FLAW analysis is intended to identify equipment re quire-
ments and establish a design priority for equipment constraints.
The individual equipment designer, however, will still have a de-
gree of latitude within system constraints and program design
criteria that will permit many alternate ways to satisfy require-
ments. The rationale for finally selecting one specific design
requires justification. For this purpose a matrix was developed
during this study to permit rapid examination of why a specific
approach was developed. It permits a sensitivity analysis to be
performed while varying the way in which each consideration is
satisfied. It readily illustrates the weighting considerations
that were used. An example of the initial matrix is given in
Figure V-1. More specific applications are given in Sections VII
and VIII of this report.
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It was found advisable to permit variation in the content
of each matrix for items such as weight, electrical power, re-
supply weight, etc. For instance, a matrix for choosing a par-
ticular design to satisfy a malfunction detection or fault iso-
lation requirement will not be traded off against the same dis-
crete elements that are involved in choosing a design to satisfy
the requirement for voice communication. Permitting this latitude
also simplifies each individual matrix by eliminating considera-
tions that are not germane to the specific trade-off.
In summary; the est.:blishment of the program and mission
ground rules, subsequent identification of specific design
oriented criteria, systems analysis to relate mission functions
to equipment satisfaction and a technique to optimize equipment
design are the basic requirements for enhancing IFM. To be
effective, these ground rules, criteria and analytical techni-
ques must be developed prior to solidifying equipment specifi-
cations and available for usage at preliminary and critical de-
sign review. The IFM requirements and expected usage or purpose
of IFM analysis should be identified in the Request for Proposal
(RFP). Further, the RFP should direct the Contractor to idenfify,
in his proposal, how the IFM analysis will'be accomplished.
IFM Ground Rules & Assumptions
The following ground rules and assumptions were developed
during the study, and formed the base upon which all results rest.
1. RUA will be accomplished at lowest reaction level.
2. Constraining envelope is the Space Station not the CSM.
3. Assume shirtsleeve environment.
4. Identify EVA requirement, if it exists, for maintaining
subsystems.
5. Consider active and passive (trends and attendant
nharacteristics) checkout.
6. Classify effects. Category I, injury or mission abort;
Category II, unscheduled resupply; Category III, mis-
sion degradation.
7. Identify single malfunctions and those causing a con-
dition of one malfunction removed from Category I or
II.
8. Guidelines and criteria developed are intended for use
at PDR's and CDR's. Not the detailed level of knob
size, toggle switch throw angle, etc.
V-4
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9. Assume single depth mounting.
10. Assume functional requirements and operational times
for Station are same as CSM.
11. MSC will provide expected life on existing equipment
at R/R level.
12. Analysis of subsystems (sort capability) will identify
most critical effect, associated critical mission
phase, and permissible downtime for the most critical
phase.
13. Only dynamic failures will be considered. No hardware
failures.
14. No powered disconnection will be made.
15. No design margins will be identified on existing equip-
ment.
16. All hardwiring exposed to cabin atmosphere is covered
and not available as test points. Switches cannot be
jumpered.
17. Treat a switch as a plug-in unit with hi-humidity con-
nector.
18. Block permissible and expected downtimes.
19. Families will be identified consistent with packaging
concepts.
2;. Trade-off Priority: Power, Weight, Volume.
21. No repair will be considered: No soldering, no weld-
ing, et-c.
22. Consider concept of cannibalizing "once-used" equip-
ment as part of commonality.
23. Displays and Controls will be studied to the exten^
necessary to determine how or if a malfunction is
detectable via one of them. Failures of the D&C°s
will not be examined.
24. Mission phases to be analyzed for effects are:
rendezvous, dock, maneuver, critical experiment
activity, operating station (OS) manned, OS unmanned
and EVA activity., Recommended redesign will recog-
nize the need to survive the ascent phase.
25. A P of .999 will be used in establishing expected time
to failure for Category II malfunctions.
26. One-away from a Class II condition or severe degrada-
tion will require a resupply.
27. Identify the best solution considering the system, not
just the end item.
28. Tolerances will identify NEED, not capability.
29. Assume 1972 Technology for redesign.
1p
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'30,,, Maintenance equipment identification will be limited to
tuo l.s for R/R.
'31. Skill/experience requirements will not be identified.
Maintenance is limited to R/R.
V. Display and controls (D&C) requirements will be identi-
i'ied as related to maintenance for the areas of re-
design. Any D&C criteria will be discussed under
monitoring and checkout criteria.
33. Accessibility requirements will be discussed under pack-
aging criteria.
34. Checkout interfaces will be discussed under monitoring
and checkout.
35. Checkout procedures will not be identified. Maintenance
is limited to R/R and fault isolation capability is at
R/R level.
36. Recommended test planning, qualification and checkout
will be limited to the high humidity connector dis-
cussion.
:'7. The engineering breadboard/mockup will not be functional
but will demonstrate principle of interconnection and
mane size of module that can be expected.
Packaging Criteria
Packaging is an extremely important aspect of the system design.
Th( packaging approach may or may not affect the realization of the
required electronic performance specifications, but will impact sys-
tem cost, weight, volume, reliability and repairability. The follow-
ing criteria should be used for selecting a packaging approach:
1. Provide direct access to R/R items, cabling, and back panel
wiring without electrically d i sconnecting other equipment.
This may be accomplished by
	 ng out, slide put or multi-
hinged devices.
2 ti Provide the extended `°tolume necessary for remove-replace
activity considering zhe volume occupied by the operator as
well as the volume required by the equipment and of its
moving parts such as doors and slides.
3. Use captive fasteners or captive locking devices for all
remove-replace items. Preferably one type of fastening
device will be used for all such items. finger operation.
is desirable, and many operational cycles-must be possible
without significant degradation.
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•	 4. Provide containment devices necessary to survive the
ascent phase that can be removed during activation of
the orbiting vehicle, or at first failure, permitting
It/R without tools for the duration of the orbital phase.
5. Provide identification or coding of modules to assist in
rapid and correct removal and replacement.
6. Provide asymetric mounting features, keys or guides at
each level of assembly for equipment requiring specific
installation orientation. This techni 4ue must also pre-
elude the possibility of interchanging electrically non-
interchangeable modules.
7. Permit remove-replace of a failed item without interrupt-
ing a redundant functional loop or another mission-critical
function.
8. Permit direct access to all adjustments and controls neces-
sary for system operation, malfunction detection and iso-
lation, and checkout. If it is not feasible to mount the
control or adjustment on the front panel or module con-
tainer, the access path will be protected to preclude
equipment damage when inserting an adjustment tool.
9. Permit plug-in module replacement without disconnecting
fluid couplings in coolant lines.
"	 10. Provide storage and containment for anticipated portable
test tools. Placement of such devices will consider
operator orientation and location of usage.
11. The coolant system will be capable of maintaining the temp-
erature of the electronic equipment within operating re-
quirements under all conditions between A) peak load
requirements, all redundancy being used and maximum operat-
ing equipment load, and B) minimum load requirements, all
redundancy failed or off and minimum operating equipment
load.
12. Provide redundant, or prme, and backup cooling capability
for mission critical equipment. Recognize that the coolant
system serves the same function as support electronics:
It supports the operating electronic equipment and its fail-
ure can result in significant equipment loss or inoperability
for the period required to effect repair.
13. Provide connectors and circuitry capable of withstanding a
high humidity environment, with its attendant contamination,
and identify a satisfactory method of purging a contaminated y;
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item to permit restoration to useful service.
14. Consider expected mission life to failure when deter-
mining acceptable leakage rates for hermetically sealed
modules. Recognize that packaging for minimum leakage
rate possible opposed to leakage rate allowable may have
significant impact on cost and weight.
15. Provide containers or enclosures, to be located within
pressurized compartments, that will structurally be ca-
pable of withstanding the greatest decompression rate
expected, considering normal operation as well as emer-
gency conditions such as meteroid penetration.
16. Provide for a flexible maintenance capability, recogniz-
ing that maintenance activity for long-duration missions
will be evolutionary.
17. Provide packaging and interconnection design, such as
modular cabling, that will permit in-flight modification
or retrofit as the technology and mission objectives change.
Technology advancement tends to obsolete electronic equip-
ment in three years, and while this does not necessarily
demand retrofit or replacement, it is quite likely that
retrofit will be desirable after five years.
18. Provide separate packaging for equipment or electronics
that have significantly lower predicted or proven re-
liability than the other equipment- in a functional loop.
Package weak links separately and provide redundancy or
sparing as necessary.
19. Provide integral lighting so that all R/R activities can
be accomplished without auxiliary or portable lighting.
20. Module size selection will consider reliability, mal-
function detection and isolation complexity, and resupply
weight and volume.
21. Selection of control vs. local spare storage or combina-
tion thereof will consider system weight and volume, in-
ventory control, system downtime, and handling techniques.
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•	 M a'lfunecion Detection Isolation and Verification (MDIV) Criteria
For the long life space station application, repair will bc:
necussary, creating a requirement for MDIV. The following cir-
L(:ria will be applied in selecting; the MDIV system:
1. Provide MDIV to the remove-replace module level,
2. Provide verification that stimulus or a command has been
received by the equipment interrogated. Monitoring or
measuring only the equipment response will not provide
adequate fault isolation when test stimuli are used for
checkout.
3. Ptjvent error propagation or damage to the MDIV system
form monitored or tnterrogatecl equipment and vice versa.
4. The MDIV system Shall be capable of verifying that the
system will not damage a replacement module.
5. Provide self-check capability in the MDIV equipment.
Self-check will also be considered for operational equip-
ment instead of using external test stimuli.
6. Provide verification of all paths where redundancy is used
internal to a module.
7. Be capable of monitoring all critical functions concurrent
with performing malfunction detection of a failed item ;)r
when performing periodic checkout. This may result in an
independent MDIV technique being used for caution, warning
and detection/isolation of those failures that can jeopar-
dize mission or cause an abort.
8. Provide the capability to test driving electronics up to
an output device, such as a thruster or engine, without
actuating the output device..
9. Provide for by-pass of a tailed item where possible to
preclude complete loss of a mission function; such as
power amplification in a communication transmission sys-
tem where by-pass will result in weak transmission but not
preclude transmission.
10. Provide limit-testing; tc isolate potential failures prior
to their occurrence.
•	 11. Minimize the number of different stimuli used or generated
by the MDIV system.
P0
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12. Where possible, use loop or functional path stimuli to
hermit functional checkout. MDIV equipment can provide
:p imple signals, such as a DC voltage, to trigger an
operational loop with a built-in stimuli and a built-in
or centralized indication of satisfactory loop performance.
13. Utilize operational checks wherever pL.sible for MDIV. Con-
summables should not be used if avoidable.
14. Use operational signals rathc than special stimuli for
check-out whenever possible. Signal loop gains and normal
outputs with given input- signals can be computed an(] tested
prior to a mission and circuit logic; comparator devices or
procedural information can he used to check out equipment
or functional loops.-
15. Consider monitoring attendant characteristics (for instance,
temperature) for qualitative measurement. This technique
can be used to sense trends and impending failure as well
as conditions that tend to effect multi-signals or outputs.
1.6.	 Provide MDIV capability that is indepndent of ground parti-
cipation.
	
Ground participation should only be considered
with regard to resupply capability at which time additional
information, equipment, consummables and skilled personnel
may be made available.
!I
17.	 Consider the use of trend analysis.	 Where economically
attractive, trend analysis can anticipate failures.
18.	 Crew safety, where applicable, shall be the overriding
consideration in MDIV system design.
19.	 Provide a means of recording malfunction detection data to
assist in failure analysis at the convenience of the mission.
20.	 Establish the MDIV requirements, taking into account the
difference in purpose and reaction time required for the
three functions of caution and warning, malfunction iso-
lation, and system verification.
.0 Redundancy Criteria
Redundancy implies more than one independent path for satisfying
a particular function..	 This technique is usually applied for in-
creasing the reliability of a system during a time when repair is nk•K
allowable.	 The following criteria should be used in determining the
appropriate redundancy for a given application:
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•	 1 , also component redundancy when a particular component has
•	 signi-Eicantly lower reliability than the other components
in a functional path. Redundancy verific::tion at this
•	 lc;vel is not rt!qu:.red.
2. Use functional path redundancy for critical paths such as
those involving crew safety. It will usually be required
Lo verify functional redundancy prior to undertaking; a
critical maneuver, and this provision should bu provided.
3. Provide separate remove-replace modules for each redundant
path wherever practical.
4+ Insure permissible reaction time in the event of failure
by choosing manual vs. automatic switching or standby vs.
in-Line redundancy. When permissible reaction time is
short, automatic switching; and active redundancy are re-
quirements; however, a manual mode can back up the auto-
matic redundant mode with an operational constraint to
of
	 after the initial failure.
i. Provide manual takeover for emergency mode. Protect tho
emergency-mode device to preclude inadvertent operation
and do not rely on automatic emergency- =node takeover.
6. Consider providing functional redundancy using different
•	 technologies: electrical and fluids, electrical and
mechanical, etc.
7. Provide analysis of the effect of fails+re on support
electronics, such as power supplies, and on signal ampli-
tude: or signal distortion to identify failure effect on
the functional loop.
;s. Provide redundant support systems such as power and
cooling for critical functions.
Commonality Criteria
Commonality will be employed to reduce Qualification Tests,
enable cannibalization of uuii-critical equipment and reduce ttit
quantity and inventory of spares required for ground and in-flight
maintenance. Candidates for commonality will be identified as part
of the systems analysis, using.the following criteria:
1. Use commonality when performance and environmental re-
quirements are identical. Prime candidates are items such
as power supplies, signal conditioning and signal process-
in- (circuitry and modules) units, and displays and controls.
.6
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2. Ur;e when performance requirement's are similar and system
penalty is insignificant in critical constraint areas
such as power. This may result in non-use of element.
of elecLr.onics within a package for one or more of the
applications but will not degrade functional loop re-
liability and permit more extensive qualification test-
in;, on the common item because of fewer items in the
sy -,Lein.
3. Use the following cons 4,derations when making commonality
trade-offs:
(a) Cannibalization may be used to partially satis-
fy sparing requiremnnts. This is particularly true
wlicrc :systems are used for limited periods of rime
or whurL• critical systems can be spars--d bJ canri-
balizing a non-critical system.
(b) Qualification costs can be greatly reduced.
(c) Spares inventory can to reduced,
(d) Checkout- system cornplex;.Ly may be minimized.
Cr-iceria for IPM Systems Analysis
One syscern analysis can serve many purposes and, ,just as de-
sign criLera can be customized for a particular set of mission equip-
menL, early identification of those purposes will permit a program
oriented sy ,;tams analysis. Further, establishing the objectives of
analysis permits identification of source data required for analysis,
analytical working dl.ta, del'..verable data and the data sorts neces-
sary to obtain visibility and enhance in-Hight maintenace. The
analysis documentation technique should be capable of translating
from working paper to data sorts and to computer application, if ne-
cescsary. The outputs or results of analysis should be separated
into discrete packages so that technical managenient, systems inte-
gration or individual design personnel can rapidly review analysis
germane to their specific area. The analysis technique must be
capable of translating from a conceptual phase to equipment acqui-
si.tion, and relate equipment and program changes to the effect on
mission functions.
.
	
	
The IFM Systems analysis will identify mission-critical function
and provide the following analysis information for each function.
1. Identify any mission constraiaits that limit or preclude
using a specific conceptual way to satisfy the mission
function.
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`	 2. Identify alternate ways to satisfy the function.
3. Analyze each alternate way and permit rapid trans-
•
Lation to equipment. requirements.
q. Identify the effect on the mission as a result of the
loss of each one of the equipment functional require-
menLs.	 Identify the mission phase associated with the
mission affect-, permissible downtime (if: any) and cate-
gorize the effects.
S. Identify equipment, elements of equipment, functional
redundancy or other means that will preclude the loss
of the critical function caused by a single failure.
6. Trzde-o£f nonfunctional requirements (operational re-
quirements, availability, cost, etc.) and identify the
technical approach to be developed.
7. Re-examine the selected approach to a.ssure mission
critical function satisfaction.
8. Perform detailed failure analysis of critical equip-
' meet elements.
9. At remove-replace level identify the types of equipment
used to satisfy each functional loop and for each type
of equipmenL identify the following;:
a.	 Subsystem identification,
b.	 Cross reference to mission function.
c.	 Program identifier (i.e., part number, drawing
number, control point).
d.	 Quantity,
Cxpectc-A mission life to failure.
f.	 Failure'/effect criticality.
g.	 Permissible downtime.
h.	 Technique for malfunction detection and fault iso-
lation.
10. Provide the capbility fo r arranging the information dr.-
valoped in items eight a.d nine into the following data
sorts.
Name of module - Alpha
r.
b.	 Mission function - Alpha
r
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C. Mission function - numeric
d. Program identifier - Numeric
C. Expected mission life to failure - Min., Max.
f. Failure/effect criticality - Cat. I, II, III.
g. Critical mission phase - ascent, rendezvous, etc. 	 i
U. Compile a list of recommended candidates f:)r functional
commonality and a list of candidates for equipment
commonality at recommended remove-replace level..
12. Compile a list of recommended candidates for equipment
commonality and equipment redundancy at levels beneath
recommended packaging.
13. Subject commonality candidates, redundancy candidates
and equipment whose failure will result in one-away from
Cat. I or II effects to in-depth failure mode analysis.
14. Ic;,.;ntify how all failures are detected at remove-replace
level.
15. Identify how the failure of redundant circuits or piece-
parts, resulting in one-away failure from Cat. I or II
effects, is detected.
Functional Loon and Alternate Wa ys Analvsis (FLAW
The systems analysis technique developed during this study was
called a Functional Loop and Alternate Ways Analysis to avoid pre-
conceived ideas associated with Failure Modes and Effects Analysis,
Fault Tree Analysis, etc. It is basically a failure effects analysis
i.dentifyin(. ways to preclude or minimize failure effect on the mission,
modules or elements requiring detailed failure modes analysis, un-
avoidable weak links. The technique was developed because no avail-
qble or known techniques satisfied the systems analysis criteria dis-
a^: :=!-i above. Boolean notation was used to permit rapid translation
`i ,^  top mission function to detailed hardware satisfaction, to pro-
.	 data sorts to satisfy specific and different- purposes, and to
piovide ultimately for the use of a computer.
Listed below are the steps, corresponding to the criteria dis-
cussed earlier, to be followed in a typical-analysis. An example is
provided wherever appropriate to illustrate the details of the tech-
nique. The sample functions used for the examples is 2-way noise
communication between Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA), Space Station
(SS) and ground (MSFN).	
y
1. Identify an.^- mission constraints that limit or preclude
using a specific conceptual way to satisfy the mission
function.
Example
No EVA SS umbilicals preclude simple audio communication.
G 's
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2. Identify alternate ways to satisfy the function or any
Cr itical loop.
Example -
("EVA•SS.MSFN = EVA-SS •MSFN • SS•EVA + EVA•MSFN•SS-EVA
Critical Loop = EVA•SS•MSFN
3. Analyze each alternate way. Subdivide into sub-functions
as necessary to simplify understanding and permit rapid
translation to equipment requirements.
Example -
No true alternate exists. The two Loop permutations will
be examined by analyzing sub-functions.
CEVA • SS = ( audio•TxRx) • (Audio•TxRx)SS
aEVA ^`"^T37"-
= a- (Audio • TxRx) ,]s'VA•MSI^'N_.^.. MSFN**
c
CSS •MSFN
	
e
4. Identify the effect on the mission-critical, function re-
sulting from the loss of each one of the equipment func-
tional requirements. Identify the mission phase associated
with the mission effect, permissible down-time (if any)
and categorize the effects.
Example -
a. Loss of EVA: Audio # CEVA•iS•CEVA•MSFN
b. Loss of EVA: Rx :A CEVA-SS
c. Loss of EVA: Tx V CEVA•SS•CSS-MSFN
d. Loss of SS: Audio V CEVA.SS•CSS-MSFN
e. Loss of SS: Rx V CEVA•SS•CSS•MSFN
Example uses Boolean notation.
MSFN capability is mandatory and can serve as backup for
EVA • SS communication in the event of spacecraft EVA Rx failure.
Separate analysis is required.
f. Loss of SS : Tx # CWA•SS.CSS.MSFN
i
V-16
Mission Critical Phase: EVA	 .
Effect: Terminate EVA
CAT II, may result- in early resupply.
Permissiale D.T.	 Time to next EVA
S. Identify equipment, elements of equipment, functional
redundancy or other means that will preclude the loss
of the critical function caused by a Single failura.
Example -
Audio
EVA • SS - 
(Mike s + Mike ^)•(Earphone l + Earphonc,2).
(P . S . 1 + P.S.2)
TxRxEVA•SS - UHF  + UHF
 
 
= VHF  + VHF  = UHF  + VHF 
6. Trade-off nonfunctional requirements (operational: re-
quirements, availability, cost, etc.) and identify the
technical approach to be developed.
hxam le
Only SS equipment is analyzed. EVA equipment requires
separate analysis.
GommEVA•SS = VHF 1	 2+ VHF = (Rx 1	 2+ Rx )USBE ('1'x l + Tx 2 ) VHF
7. Re-examine the selected approach to assure mission
critical function satisfaction or critical elements and
mission effect.
Examp le -
USBE available ^ sLy when in contact with MSFN.
VHF is primary mode and the VHF Tx function is required
for each loop.
VHF 1+VHF2= Ant 
I 
*Ant 2 •Ant Swt • Triplex • (SwtA + SwtB)-
(Rx l + Rx2 ) • ( TX1 + TX2).
ACP 1(ACk* 1+AC3) + ACP 2 (AC I +AC 2 )+ACP 3 (AC 2 +AC 3)
ACP = Audio Control Panel • Dual. mikes & Earphones
CP = Audio Center Channel
tV-1.7
Energy Sources and buses are triplicate.
Critical Elements: An('. I Ant 2 'Ant 5wt -Trip Lcxr,r
Lo ss of:
.a. Ant i F Ant  # CommEVA•SS
May require attitudo, maneuver to rest ore.
b. Ant Swt # CommEVA.SS
Terminate EVA phase
e. Triplexer # Duplex Comm,
Corn ii L is 	 Task & Terminate RVA•
8. Perform failure analysis of critical elements.
9. At remove-replace level identify the type of equipment
used to satisfy each functional loop and for cacti tjpe
of equipment Uentify the following:
a. Subsystem identi:_ication.
b. Cross reference to mission function.
c. Program identifier (i.e., part number, drawing
number, control point) .
d. Quantity.
e. Expected mission life to failure.
f. Failure/effect criticality.
g. Permissible downtime.
h	 'Technique for malfunction detection and fault
isolation.
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t l,	 Vrovi ck- tii( ,
 c:apab Al Ly for arrar);;,i ng the inforrnation
Irvc l r,pc cl i.ri Ltr-ftns (A.;;l t rind ni.nc into the follow-
i n;; iInLr.i , ;ort: s.
;i.	 I'l
 ame of module - Al.plia.
I), Mission function - Alpha
L.	 Mission  function - Numeric
(I. Program ident-iflur - Numeric
U, Expected mission life to failure - Min., Max.
F. Failure/effect criticality - Cctt. I, 11 9 III
f;,, Critical mission phase - ascent:, rendezvous, eLc.
11. Compile a list of recommended candidates for funcLionat
commonality and a list of candidates for equipment coin-
monali.ty at recommended remove/replace level.
I2. Compile a last of recommended candidates for equipment
redundancy at levels beneath recommended packaging,
1.3. Subject commonality candidates, redundancy candidates
and equipment whose failure will 17c5ult in one-way
from► Cat. I or II effects to iodepta failure mock;
analysis.
14. Identify how all failures are detected at remove-re-
place level.
15. Identify how the fa`.1ure of redundant circuits or
piece-parts, resulti.ng in one-away failure from Cat.
I or II effects, i^, detected.
r0
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st;^.ra:c)c^ V1 - REDESIGN
Our redesign utilizes the systems analyzed earlier, extra-
pointing their design into an in-flight mainta.i.nab:le system for
Space Station '75. A very Laportant point which should be a
f,ui.clepo5t: for any effort on this subject was made in 1). A. Barnes'
paper. (Barnes, 1968), In-flight Maintenance Study fol: Space St a -
tions and Spacecraft; 'TExtrapolation is more effective than pure
prediction; therefore, we must. investigatc a the possi.bliLy of using
existing capabilities and resources "as is" or modifying them be-
foro we attempt a totally new capability." Apollo Block II sys-
Lcorms arcs obvious candidates for such an approach.
A ba.,iic assumption for this redesign was that thu same
functions are required oil 	 Space Station as were required on
Apollo. This intentionally reduce:, the redesign to more of a
repackaging and restructuring ;job than a true redesign. Some
reasons are: (1) it was not only difficult but inappropriate: to
provide any really meaningful functional. rOdU.Si gn for the spaco
sLat:ion wiLhin tile scope and visibility of this contract, and,
(2) by wai.ntaining the same: functions, many of the cxisting Apollo
circuit,,,,. and schematics could be utilized, thereby providing great-
or conf i.dence in estimates of module size, shape, quantity, fail-
oircn rate, laul.t•
 iciol.ati,on requirements, etc.
Some minor changes, which will be discussed in more detail.
Later, were made in the hardware configuration to provide compa-
Li.bility with the Space Station but wer.: not intended to optimize:
it. The idea was to take a cross section of Apollo electronics
capable of performing Space Station functions and reconfiguring
it for in-flight maintainability in such a way that any change;
in function, or any new functions added to the 'basic systems,
such as CMG, rendezvous o17 balancing electronics, would not im-
pact the basic approach 40opted in the study.
Component Selection For Re-Design
In the 1973 time period, the hardware to be utilized will.
use essentially today's tec;iinology. Concerning components, tile;
key decision to be macje was whether or not to extensively utilize
Large Scale Integrated Circuits (LSI). The decision reached was
to use micro-logic and hybrid micro-circuits, Medium Scale Inte-
grated Circuits (MSI) where they are availabl,o, and L4I only as
available now for for memory and computer applications.
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The reason for this decision is the concern in industry to-
day ghat improper application, of LSI Techniques will, result in
cxLremel.y costly syscams, hence: thi,a technology is being princi.-
l)rAl Ly applied where a large number of circuit functions of the
tiame type: are nc ecic.d, i.e., in computers, but even here a recent
%tjrvc y of (Jj.;ht aero4 acc computer^^ now in development showed
r y n'ly two comml ttud to LSI, and no TaSI used in 50 existing aero-
,tp acv cumputvrs (Baec4lor, 1969) . Adding weight to this decis Lon
Is the lack of intellectual committment to LSI can the part of s,ys-
ti- ,mN deli ners (Fetli and Smith, 1968).
The start;-up cost to build a typical LSI circuit has been
stated as $10,000 to $50,000 (Leeds, 1969) ; this provides the
masking, and necessary tooling to produce one circuit. Beyond
this the circuits are li;cei.y to be inexpensive, but a changes of
any sort in the circuit function or detail wilt requirt^ another
start-up cost.
MST is in somewhat better shape!, wherein several commonly
used functions, o.g., sh.ft registers, adders are built into a
single package and offered commercially at present. Thes,_ are
principally digital functions.
In Linear circuits, various types of amplifiers are packagod
as, micro-cirr;uit:s, but the more compli.catecl„ or less us Al functions
nro not.
While thU outlook might seam pessimistic, the packaging
schema chosen allows the incorporation of LSI should it be more
broadly Ytilizod than anticipated. This would allow more func-
tions to be included in each replaceable! module.
Where linear circuits are involved, it is often found that
none: of the abovo integrated circuits will, satisfactorily fulfill.
the needs, hence we must utilize ordinary resistors, transistors,
capacitors and the like. Capacitors in particular are space con-
suming, and have been found to sariou.^51y compromise the .AdvanL._,"cs
offered by certain exotic packaging schemes, for instance the hy-
brid s.-haute described elseawhero in this report.
One way around the ;.li.l fict (ties created by linear circuitti, ►
is to convert all analog functions to digital as early as possible.
Many funct:i.ont are now troateu this stay at some point in the sig-
n4l path, but in most instances tho digitizing can only be carried
back to the prn i.mi.ty of tl}o sonsor or data source, hence how much
Is dlgital anti how much Is analog becomes largely a mattor of do-
g;rc.o. Drvak-through In digital sensors will help, such as the
laser gyre (Minor, 1909; Schappol, 1969).
r0
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There arc; attendant difficul"Acs in digitizing; that must be
t radud of] , not thr_^ least of t;hes4 is the fact that some computa-
tions ghat have been historically handled in an analog fashion are
;;omcwhat c:umbursome to handle digitally and ruqui.re either dis-
•	 propor.kionaLu amount of hardware or computer power to solve;
(Jo,;od loop servos and IF amplifiers for example;. However, if
pr,c^;,,;urc^ is brought to bear, many system functions could perhaps
be rede,%ig,ned to take advantage of MSI or LSI, notably repeater
amplifirra, converters, filters, frequency synthesizers, phased-
array antonnas anti microwave transmitter cir, -uitry (Loods, 1969) .
A trade-off shows that we will probably wish to continue
un, ing analog circuits for at leas t part of the nocussary functions
In a spacecraft, hence any standardized packaging; schume should
he able to accommodate either without compromising the effective-
ness of the approach.
Present Apollo Design
A block diagram of the Block II Guidance and Control is de-
picted in Figure VI-1 and Telecommunications in Figure VI-2.
The components, or "black boxes', comprising these three systems
aro provide(] in Figures VI-3, IV-4 and IV-5.
The Apollo Guidance and Control provides the electronics for
;hiving the active elements of vehicle control,, namely the Roac:-
t con Control, Jots and Service Propul,iion System thrust: vector and
can/off control. These electronics ore in the form of 2 SCS "black
boxes" which accept inputs from either the Primary Guidanco and
Navigation System, the SCS "backup" control system, or direct
manual commands from the pilot. The GO can dcatarmina its iner-
tial orientation and maintain it as a reference tor gonerating
control sya,tem commands derived via the G&N computer. The SCS
backup control system cannot determine its orientation without
ground information, but can maintain 4 reference for purposes of
holding vehicle attitude during RCS and SPS maneuvers. It does
not have a steering; capability nor does it have the performance
capability of the G&N. The SCS provides redundant displays
essential to guidance and control as weall 49 the electronics ne-
cossary to drive these displays,
4
Summarizing then, the G&N provides the sole source of guid-
anco and the prime source of control.. The SCS provides a back-
up source of control, x all the final.-stage driving electronics,
pWN peripheral equipment a;ach as displays and hoind controls.
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VI-9
The telecommunications system in figure VI-2 is composed of
a coimnunicacions link using V11F irequenc:ies for earth orbital
entry communication LM/EVA communication, and a backup ranging
capability. Another system at S-Band frequencies provides the
same communication functions in addition to the lunar phase cnrn-
munications where V11F is not adequate. The S-Band system it also
essential to the data transmission function. This is a major
part of the Telecommunication System, involving most of the PO441
Signal Conditioner, Data Storage, Updata Link and Premodulatio n
Processor Equipment. The remaining equipment is the .ludic ampli-
fiers and headsets.
Redesixn
It has already been pointed out that the Space Station
furc r ional requirements for G&C and telecommunications are
assumed to be the sale as the Apollo functions described above.
Nevertheless, so^.ae changes to the G&C wn.re
 felt necessary to
make it at least compatible with the Space Station program. The:
first was to plan on a requirement for two independent and iso-
lated G&C systems. The Space Station RFP (NASA-1969a) stipulates
in Paragraph 3.3.4 that any single compartment must be able to be
isolated in the event of a catastrophe within it. "The remaining;
compartments will be equipper! and provisioned so that the crew can
safely live and take correction action or return to earth." There
undoubtedly are several ways of satisfying this requirement, how-
ever, for this study we assumed two identical systems, an approach
which has distinct advar,.tages such as maximizing commonality and
cannibalization. Also, the performance of the backup system is
not degraded from the primary, and ma).1 mum power down of a "down"
system is permitted during repair.
It would be reasonable to assume that even with the redun-
dancy of two identical systems, each system must have some manual
means of backup control for critical or crew safety opeations.
As on Apollo, critical failures must be reacted to with virtually
no down-time. Aside from these special cases a down-time for re-
pair on the order of an hour could be tolerated and repair com-
pleted within an hour as well. In addition, the availability of
an identical system for operation while one is down would seem
to indicate that down-times of conctderably more than an hour
would not create any serious impact.
With these considerations in mind it was a relatively
straight forward process to sort out Apollo circuitry that would
perform the required functions withir the envelope of Space
VT- 10
Station '75. The SCS backup control capability was deleted,
since sufficient redundancy exists in the two independent systems.
Each of the two systems includes a complete G&N system plus the
functional equivalent of the SCS components pi.cLured in Figure VI-6;
SCS driver electronics (RJEC, TVSA, 1/2 of the ERA), a rotation and
translation control, displays (FDAI & GP/FPI) and a gyro package
for rate sensing and display. A block diagram of the new 	 stem i,;
provided in Figure VI-7.
In Figure VI-7 an executive computer has been shown at the
bottom of the figure. This was provided because of the likelihood
of such a device being required on space station in some form or
another. Its function would pi.tmarily be to monitor toe r'ystem
performance and vehicle response for the pu-oose of rransLerring
to a backup or alternate mode of operation in the event of a
failure. Its output night he no more than a switching function
such as is represented in simplified form on the figure. It is,
however , a function that could be performed by an alert and con-
tintiously on-station crew, therefore, for the purposes of this
limp ified redesign, the eX cutive computer was not considered.
Tile Telecommunication System w:js considered unchanged from
Apollo though the electronics location could be split up to insure
that loss of a module does not lose all communication. A factor
which was igno,-ed in this redesign is that the data processing
functions on Space Station will be considerably increased. On the
other hand, they will very likely become part of a separate Data
Management System; therefore, details on that part of the telecom-
nu.acations have been minimized in the redesign.
The next step was to place the components of each of the sys-
tems in proper perspective with respect to location. In Figures
VI-8 and VI-9 all. those component:: which are finitely defined in
size and shape as well as location, such as antennas, center-of-
gravity oriented sensors, and controls are shown on the exterior
of what is referred to as the electronics bay. It is the equip-
ment within this bay which is highly flexible, not only in how it
can be packaged, but in location as well. Consequently it was
the real subject of this redesign for in-flight maintainability.
This is not to imply the sensors, controls and antennas located
on the structure are not remove/replace maintainable, however, it
is not an electronics packaging redesign as much as a redesign
in the mechanical securing and aligning of the components. The
problems in this area are not few in number and in all fairness
warrant a study by itself.
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T
The final decision required to complLte J efinition of the
redesign was - Just how should the electronics in those respec-
tl"e electronic _nys be configured to optimize mainnn-nce?
There are many different approaches feasible :such as packaging
for a standard module size, or mKimum we',,ht and volume, or
min 4 m"m resupply weight, or maximum environmental protcrtion as
on Apollo. With respect to in-flight matntr.nance, however, it
was decided a key consideration in layout of the electronics was
optimum fault isolation, therefore it served as Lhe principal cri-
teria for the first cut at hardware configuration. Optimum is de-
fined as a fault isolation scheme that utilizes a minimum of fault
isolation test points and a minimum complexity in the fault iso--
laLion equipment yet still isolates any failure to a remove/replace
level wii' a high degree of confidence. Another guideline followed
that is directly related and compatible with optimum fault isola-
tion was to maximize the functional paQ commonality tabulated
earlier In Table IV-4. Wherever these criteria still afforded a
chjice the package was defined as that size that was most conven-
ient for single-hand remove/replace activity. This is duscussed
in more detail. later in this section.
Having performed this first cut at packaging based on fault
isolation the resulting configuration was then traded off and no-
dified co comply with all ether packaging constraints in the IFM
packaging matrix, Table VII-1, such as environment, doling and
connections. The result of thi3 iterative process is typified in
Figures 10 and 11. Each box represents a single electronic module.
Each module is described in more detail in the Replaceable Parts
List, Tables VI-1 and VI-2. The original Apollo G&C Circuitry in-
cluded in each respective module is indicated in the remarks v>>umn
of Cable VI-1. There are a total of 47 electronic modules in GLC
which, together with the sensors, etc., come to a system complement
of 61; or 122 per space station. The corresponding total for Tele-
communicacians is 199.
At this point a final attempt was made at increasing common-
ality in the system. One method is to find dollar but not iden-
tical modules in the respective component list that can be packaged
as a common item. Those parts of the circuits which are unique to
the one location and not the other are wired to the connector such
that thay are acti —e only when in the proper location. It seems
reasonable that this common packaging is practical only when the
common elements of the circuits approach something more than 50%
and ideally more than 75'/x. Only one commonality candidate in the
G&C system was identified in this category. The Rate/Att. Error
Display Electronics nodule (Component 4112; of which 2 are required,
perform 2 different functions yet are interchangeable.
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•
Another candidate f-)r coirnnonality with far more potential
Is the Standardization of power supplies. A detailed discussion
of standardized power supplies is provided at the and of this
;ccLion. Standardization of power :supplies was nor. reflected in
the redesign represented in Fi;;ures VI-10 and VI-11, primarily to
illustrate the variance in type and q uantity of power supplies
that Flo cr.i :ct on the current Apollo hardware. A summary for r&c
1% provided in 'fable VI-3. Another r(-asor ► for not standardizing
the power srpplies in the redesign is that in standardization
!come impact on circuit redesign IS Inevitable as pointed out on
page V1 -47. Rather than try to reflect this impact on the elec-
tronics design the power supplies ware left "as is"; however in
the eventual design for Space Statiu n it is recommended that
standardization of power supplies be a primary design goal.
To provide further insight as to what was considered opti-
mum fault isolation and just how each of the modules are isolated
refer to Figures VI-12 thru VI-23. A summary of total test point
requirements is provided in Tables VI-!+ and VI-5. Only a few re-
presentative examples of telecommunt at:ions fault isol-tion cir-
cuits are provided, Figures VI-22 and VI-23.
Some definitiut	 of terms used in the Test Point Summary and
on Figures VI-12 chru VI-23 is warranted at this time.	 "STIMULI".
IL or "ADDITIONAL STIMULI" refers to stimuli required which is not
mechanized on Apollo or available through any operational means.
"PASSIVE" test points are temperatures, power supply voltages,
oscillators and a select few events all of which can be monitored
at any time without interferring in circuit operation.	 "ACTIVE"
test points are those that are actively varying during system
operation, therefore require removal o 	 the system from line
operation and monitored under a given stimuli condition for
proper assessment of systems operation.	 "C & W", or Caution and
Warning, test points are those test points that are routed to
some audible or visible caution and warning system. 	 Those test
points are limited to (1) critical system parameters, that,	 if
failed, are not immediately obvious to the crew In other visual
cues or because a crewmal iL not at station; or (2) those sys-
tem parameters that, if failed, are not obvious to the crew in
vehicle operation until the next periodi.: check,	 :..	 may resu..t
in a degraded performance that can jeopardize mission objectives.
The total number of test points required for both of the
identical G&C systems, including passive, active and G&W are 456.
Other esr-i.aatis have ranged from 450 (Ligocki, 1968) to 1050
(Jorgenson 1969) for G&C on Space Platforms. 	 The total Telecom-
munications requirements were 505 test points.	 (Jorgenson 1968)
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estimated 1000 Test points for a space platform Information Man-
,	 agement System.
The optimum module size determined in Section VII proved to
be very similar to that within the existing Apollo telecommunica-
tion "boxes". Consequently, this general module configuration was
maintained for the redesign. On this basis the telecommunication
requirements were then estimated from an average number of test
points/module arrived at in the G&C electronics test poi_.t analysis.
This average was on the order of 3 per module; however, certain of
the equipment requirements in Table VI-5 were biased one way or
the other, based on knowledge of the system and circt-f- design,
in order to provide as realistic an allocation of te5. , 'nts as
possible without detailing each of the many circuits in the Tele-
communications System. It is important to note the test point
total in Table VI-5 could have been reduced by combining several
components into one larger component such as was done with the G&C
D/A-A/D converter (G&C Component #21). The reason it is not re-
commended is the difference in the type of circuits. An illustra-
tion of this is provided in Figures VI-24 and VI-25. The A/D-D/A
converter (Figure VI-24) is a 10 board (4" x 5") module with con-
siderable interrelationship between the 10 boards. Were this mo-
dule broken into 5 smaller modules the number of test points re-
quired for complete isolation is 60, as opposed to the single
larger unit which requires only 31. For typical series-c-rnnected
Telecommunication modules the reduction in test points by combining
four 2-board modules together is from 8 to 5, as illustrated in
Figure VI-25. This difference of 3 test points seems a small
penalty to pay for the decrease in spares resupply weight and
volume. Additional motivation for keeping the A/D-D/A converters
in large modules is the complex and nonstandard type of signals
interconnecting the smaller modules. Considerably more training
and knowledge would be required to ascertain the operability of
tb q smaller modules as opposed to the straightforward inputs and
out;)uts of the larger module. For Telecommunications this signal
complexity varies little from large to small modules.
An estimate of failure rate of the redesigned G&C is tabu-
lated in Table VI-6. The system total is one failure per 26 days.
The Telecommunication remains unchanged at 1 failure/297 days.
Neither this figure nor that of the G&C has taken into account
failure rates of the additional connections and wiring due to
repackaging; however, for the type of comparison to be made this
can be neglected. Taking the two failure rates together, assum-
ing one G&C and the Telecommunications on continuously and one G&C
in standby, the electronics total is 1 failure per 26.7 days or
6
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(b) 1 LARGE MODULE ( 10 bds) PER CHANNEL (TOT - 3)
ITEM ( a) REQUIRES 72 TOTAL 'i;ST POINTS FOR ISOLATION
ITEM ( b) REQUIRES 36 TOTAL TEST POINTS FOR ISOLATION
SAVINGS 36 TEST POINTS
NOTE: NUMBER IN PARENTHESIS BESIDE TEST POINT INDICATE QUANTITY. NO NUMBER INDICATES
QUANTITY - 1.
FIGURE VI-24 ALTERNATE PACKAGE SIZE FOR G&C A/D - D /A CONVERSION
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FIGURE VI-25 ALTERNATE PACKAGE SIZE FOR TYPICAL COMM. MODULE
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approximately one a month. From the Telecommunication weight of
391 pounds, the G&C weight of 822 pounds and a total number of
components of 319 (See Table VI-1 and VI-2), the average resupply
weight is '~48  pounds/year, or 1/25 of the total system weight;
compared with an Apollo Block II resupply weight of 400 pounds or
1/2 of the total system weight.
The power requirements for just one of the two G&C Systems
was calculated at 750 watts while operating and 83 watts in stand-
by. This is compared with 1000 watts and 115 watts respectively,
for the original Apollo G&C (=able IV-6). Assuming one G&C opera-
ting and one in standby, the total of all three systems (Telecom-
munications remains unchanged at 503 watts), is 1.3 KW compared
with 1.5 KW on original Apollo (Table IV-6).
Maintenance of Power Supplies
Maintenance of power supplies begins at the design lcvel,
for good design represents minimal maintenance. If the good de-
sign is standardized for many system components, a failure in a.
power supply is most readily remedied by replacing the unit with
a standardized spare supply. Martin Marietta's Denver Division
Electronic Research Department has been utilizing a standardized
power supply for various equipment developed under NASA contracts;
a supply for power requirements varying from 5 watts to 30 watts.
While there are penalities paid in standardization, the advantages,
in most cases, far outweigh the shortcomings.
Some of the advantages are as follows:
1. Design time minimized.
2. A minimum nun.,.!r of parts types need qualifying.
3. Qualification testing is reduced through connonality.
4. Maximum experience and failure rate data can be obtained
from multiple applications.
5. Con.anality of parts and spare power supplies is maxi-
mized.
Some of *he penalities are as follows:
1. Equipment must be designed with some standardization in
in voltages.
2. Efficiency var-es with load.
3. All voltages in i standard supply will not be required
in every application, hence a. weight and volume penalty.
4. The power supply configuration may influence the size ;aad
shape of the entire electronic package.
0VI-48
The following presents some design philosophy for establish-
ing a standard design. A standard design will be described and
actual performance data will be presented for several different
applications .
One of the first steps for establishing a good design is to
provide realistic and practical specifications. We have found
that very few circuits require voltage regulations better than
±34 or ripples under 50 millivolts. These specifications are
usable even with highly accurate instrumentation circuits3 except-
ing such applications as A/D converter reference voltages. Where
the situation requires a highly accurate and stable voltage, ad-
ditional local regulation should be used. While an exotic power
supply may be asthetically attractive, the unnecessary complexity
and constraints imposed on part selections by excessive specifi-
cations can do nothing but reduce reliability.
Another important step in good design is to select and use
all components well within their ratings, particularly true where
power switching devices and tantalum capacitors are involved. A
figure of margin recommended as a general goal is 504 of manu-
facturer's specifications on voltage and power ratings.
There are obviously other factors influencing a good power
supply design but the items mentioned above contribute most to
good reliability.
Figure VI-26 is a basic schematic diagram of a standard
power supply. The design of this supply employs the foregoing
design criteria. The power supply is divided into sections as
shown by the dashed lines; an input filter, a preregulator, a
do-dc converter, and output filters. These section are installed
in separate compartments in the shielded power supply case to
minimize E24I difficulties. A brief explanation of the circuit
is included in Figure VI-26 is presented as follows for those
readers unfamiliar with switching preregulated power supply
operation:
The input filter consists of two EMI filters, FL-LP3
and FL-LP4, and LC filter L1 and C3. These filters de-
couple incoming fill from the power supply and also decouple
noise generated in the supply from the power bus. Diode
CR1 prevents accidental reverse voltage from damaging the
supply.
l
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The pre-regulator provides all of the voltage regula-
tion in the power supply and limits the peak voltage applied
to the conve.,....	
---k voltage on the converter were
to equal normal power bus rtu., "..::	 9- lection of fast
power transistors for con ,,:rter applicatiu., 'i diffi-
cult. The pre-regulator is a low level switching regulator.
Transistors Q1 and Q2 are the series switch and are initial-
ly on, allowing C8 to be charged to a fixed voltage thru the
primary inductance of TI. The voltage of C8 is determined
by the voltage sensing feedback amplifier consisting of tran-
sistors Q3, Q4, Q5, and associated cow. .,onents. When C8 is
charged to the proper value, Q1 and Q2 are turned off, but
energy is stored in T1 and current continues flawing thru
Ck3 and T1 into C8 and the load. As the load removes energy
from the circuit the voltage across C8 drops below the re-
ference and Q1 and Q2 again turn on, repeating the cycle.
Thus the voltage across C8 remains constant. The switching
regulator is also known as a demand regulator: because pnrjer
is essentially furnished only upon request of the load.
The do-dc converter is a conventional two transistor -
two transformer free running converter. Frequency is de-
termined by a small saturating transformer in the base drive
circuits of the transistors. Voltage and power transforma-
tion to the loads is accomplished by an unsaturated trans-
former in the transistor collector circuits. For additional
discussion of this switching action refer to Roddam, 1963
and Royer, 1955.
Output filters are provided for the full-wave rectified
outputs of the power transformer.
The output voltages suggested for the power supply are based
upon the use of both linear and digital integrated circuits in
the electronics. A 5-volt output is provided to operate digital
integrated circuits. Plus and minus 15 volts are compatible with
most linear integrated circuits. Voltages of +40 and -25 are
typical voltages for operating multiplexer circuits.
The described power supply design has been used (in some
cases with minor modifications that could have been avoided) on
the following NASA contracts:
6
	
NAS9-8146	 PCM Telemetry System
	
NAS9-8301	 PAM Decommutator System
	
NAS8-20960	 Telemetry Programmer
	
NAS8-25066
	 Remote Multiplexer
	
NAS8-24682	 Frequency Division Multiplexer.
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In addition there have been several other contracts where
the basic design was used along with some additional power condi-
tioning fur high peak power circuits.
The foregoing list represents 15 power supplies, the major-
ity of which were temperature tested (-55 0C to +7500 and vibra-
tion tested (sine and random typically 10G). Performance of all
supplies was excellent. The history shows no semiconductor fail-
ures after correct assembly and only a few capacitor failures,
rone of which occurred after the first day of operation. None
of the parts were actually screened beyond commercial levels
prior to installation. While these contracts still do not pre-
sent a large amount of statistical data, the multiple use of a
single design demonstrates a confidence level for a high relia-
bility and minimum maintainability that would not be achieved
from five different designs. The penalties that were paid in
some of the contract by standardization will now be examined.
When the power supply is operated at 10 watts input, which
the original design goal, and 507. of the 1 -ad is at 5 volts,
efficiency for a 28 volt input is approximately 73%. When
power input- is reduced to 5 watts, the efficiency at 28 volts
ps to 67%. When the power input is increased to 30 watts and
of the load is at 5 volts, the efficiency is still 60%.
It is obvious there is no severe penalty in efficiency by
'	 using a standard supply. This is further emphasized by the fact
that where the lowest efficiency occurs (at the high load) al-
most 4 watts of power is lost in the 5 volt rectifiers. This
:R	 situation would not change appreciably with a custom design for
30 watts.
Where there is a large change in load distribution as well
as a vastly changing load there is some degradation in load re-
gulation. The rectifier voltage drop, in the case illustrated
above changes about 0.1 volt. There will alsc; be an increase in
the IR drops. Fortunately, digital integrated circuits will
operate satisfactorily from 4.5 volts to 5.5 v,)lts.
A problem with the package size could not be avoided in
one contract. The standard power supp'_y volume exceeded the
available space by A%. This problem had ^o be resolved by
higher density packaging of the power supply.
The foregoing represent the major disa,,'vantages of a stan-
dard design. It is felt that a standardisation technique
was
the
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6
is still applicable to mos systems. For example, where maximum
efficiency is paramount for all applications in a system, a
power supply design can be constructed with voltage and current
techniques to proportion switch drive :pre-regulator and conver-
ter) powers to the load and proportion losses to loads. This
will o;)viate secondary short circuit protection unless unduly
complicated circuits are added. If minimum size is paramount
high density standard packaging is possible. Design and con-
struction costs will go up and reliability may go down slightly.
Our limited experience with high density packaging sloes not indi-
cate a substantially reduced reliability.
In conclusion a recommended maintainable power supply is
the basic type of circuit described herein. Efficiency, load
variations, unused voltages, and packaging density have been
considered and deemed acceptable. Short circuit protection in
the design would be retained. A reasonable standard package
size for powers from zero to 50 watts appears to be about 20
cubic inches. Typical dimensions of a plug in module shielded
and filtered for EMI are 4" x 5" x V. See photo in Figure VI-27.
In U.e area of EMI, some of the test specifications the
standard power supply discussed above is successfully complied
with are:
1) IESD, EMC-10, Interf ,-,rence Control Requirements Earth
Resources Sur ,.`y System Specification. (NAS-MSC).
2) IESD, 19-3, -Interference Control Requirements for
Spacecraft Equipment, (PEAS-MSC).
3) MIL-I-26600.
0VI-53
Figure V 1-27 Standardized Power Supply
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VII. PACKAGING DESIGN
With some limitations, the methods used for packaging are
derived from the end item constraints. If, for example, weight
and volume minimization are among the mos F
 important constraints,
then it is reasonable to spend the extra money required to design
and build 3D cordwood modules. It may even be necessary to have
some circuit functions built in custom designed hybrid or inte-
grated microcircuits. At the opposite end of the scale, where
cost is the major consideration and weight and volume are less
important, the system could be built using planar component arrays
or single or double sided PC boards. For this system, the compo-
nents would not be crowded on the boards making the boards easier
to design and build.
The packaging system for a space station will fall some-
;	 where between the above extremes. The design constraints require
definition. Should the systems be individually customized or
should they be standardized? What kinds of packaging at the high
(system) and low (component and module) levels should be consider-
ed allowable?
At the high level we might consider standard racks with plug-
in modules; or standard, sealed chassis with standard or non-stan-
dard interior packaging; o1 non-standard, sealed chassis with stan-
dard or non-standard interior packaging.
At the low level of electronic packaging, for most components,
we can consider planar arrays versus volumetric (3-D) arrays for
components.
Packaging Trade-Offs
On what basis are packaging design decisions made? How does
one assure himself that these decisions are optimum? A packaging
trade-off matrix, Figure VII-1 demonstrates the use of the IFM
matrix as a tool for effectively making and documenting the ra-
tionale for the decisions. The list of criteria includes important
independent factors that should be considered. Some of these cri-
teria items are discussed and clarified below:
System Weight - When considering standard vs non-standard
packaging design this includes the electronics modules or
sub-assemblies, wiring, connectors, housings, all levels of
mounting structures including those to the spacecraft struc-
ture, and all items required for electronics thermal control.
0
0VII-2
IT84
o	 ,`
8	 ^ti
^	 ^	 ,y^
	 ,p^	 8^	 , ^s' ^ o^► ^y 8	 8	 $ c3^
CONSIDERATIONS	 co$
7 WEIGHT-SYSTEM	
4	 7	 7	 7	 3	 6	 9	
L^4 S
	
4
	
28	 49	 49	 49	 21	 42	 63	 3	 35	 2^8
10 RELIABILITY	 S	 7	 8	 3 10,0-' 2	 8	 8	 8	 10
FUNCTION	 50	 70	 80	 30	 100	 20	 80	 80	 80	 100
5 RELIABILITY7
	
8	
L^i^o LO
	
2	 10	 810
MODULE	 35	 40 	 SO	 LO	 SO 	 40	 50
7 R/R ACCESSI- 10 6 7 7 7 7 7 10 8 8BILITY 70 42 49 49 49 49 49 70 56 56
S4^
SPECIAL FEATURE 7 7 8
L,--2
8 8 8 8 3 9,,o-' 520(HI HUMIDITY & 21 21 4 24 24 24 24 9
500
4 COST - NON 10 3 8 7 9 10
*,0,-6
480
RECURRING 40 12
N.,,4 A36
32 28 36 40 46U +
COST - 10 3 7 6 8 10 440
I
6 RECURRING 60 18 42 36 48 60 i420
4 6 LO 9 2 S LO 5 4 400
4 SYSTEM VOLUME 6 24 40 36 ^ 0 40 ^^36 20 16 380
I COZHPARISON OF
9 INTERCONNEC- 4 7 LO 6 10,00000 3 7 0 0 0 MODULE SIZE
TIONS 6 63 90 54 90 21 63 0 0 0
a
7 TRAINING, PRO- 8 3 4 5 4 5 6 9 5 4
CEDURES, TOOLS 56 2 28 35 28 35 42 63 35 28
6 EQUIPMENT 2 2 10 2 10 7 9 9 9
COMMONALITY ^ 42 1 12 60 12 60 42 54 54 54
F
8 POWER 0 0 Oe 0 0 0 0 7 9 6
(COOLING) 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 72 48
T 0 T A L S 454 372 456 441 416 391 527 447 454
KEY
BEST - 10 A
WORST	 1
N/A	 0
B
A - WEIGHT
B - PRODUCT OF WEIGHT AND WEIGHTING FUNCTION
P A C K A G I N G	 D E S I G N
T R A D E- 0 F F	 M A T R I X
FIGURE VII-1
t
y
3
1'.
1I
VII-3
FiinctLonal Reliability and Module Reliability - As a sys-
tem is divided into smaller modules, the reliability of
the individual module is increased, however, the system
reliability decreases simply because of the increased
number of connections.
R/R Accessibility (Tool Complexity) - This was considered
in terms of how easily and quickly a small part of a system
could be replaced, and how many special tools might be re-
quired for this.
Special Feature (High Humidity and Changes) - The special
feature of particular interest for this matrix is the
effectiveness of the designs for a high humidity environ-
ment. Also considered was the flexibility required to per-
mit somewhat less expensive re-supply items, if and when
the high humidity problem is relieved.
Non-recurring; ..^.ost - This includes all design costs, tool-
ing, and for sotae items, fabrication.
Recurring Cost - This includes fabrication, spares, and
incorporation of design changes.
System Volume - This considers the total volume required
for the electronics systems.
Interconnection.,; - Minimizing the number of interconnecLioiis
was considered desirable. Dividing a system into smaller
modules increases the number of connections.
Training, Procedures, Tools - This includes the total of
these items at all levels, from the factory through to astro-
naut operation of the spacecraft.
Equipment Commonality - This is the level to which equipment
can be J!-signed such that various functions in the same or
even different sy-.items will be performed by identical modules.
Power (Cooling) - A Comparison of Coolant Pumping Power.
Each of the above criteria was assigned a weighting function
(at the left on Figure VII-1) based on its importance.
The various aspects of packaging that were studied using the
matrix were; standard vs non-standard package design, module size,
and cooling. Each of the alternatives in a given trade-off, as
6
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listed at the top of the matrix, were given a desir- 01ility score
with respect to each criteria listed at the lef ,_.	 criteria's
weighting function was `hen multiplied by each des_ 	 ;ty score
and finally, all of the scores were added to provide an indication
of the respective worth of alternatives. Some additional discus-
sion of the alternatives follow.
SU.ndardizat ion
Non-standardized, or customized, vs standardized packaging
was considered first in the Trade-Off Matrix, Figure VII-1. Either
method can be used in a spacecraft system, but the standardized
approach has a number of advantages. Standardized packaging was
defined to mean a restricted number of configurations with some al-
lowance for flexibility, bath of size and methods of packaging.
One of the features considered as a part of standardization was the
	 f
use of racks containing several systems and subsystems, roughly
equivalent to packaging in a standard 19 inch laboratory equipment
rack. The advantages of standardization include:
1) Reduced subsystem packaging design effort.
2) Reduced design and fabrication costs for mounting
structure and coolant system.
3) Reduced test tooling costs for qualification tests,
4) Reduced qualification testing due to mechanical
similarity between modules.
5) Reduced design/development for high humidity require-
ments.
6) Improved R/R accessibility.
7) Reduced training, procedures, and tools for handling R/R•
8) Vehicle cabling between equipment cabinets is simplified.
9) Mechanical form factors are well documented, hence inter-
face problems for new systems are lessened.
Some disadvantages of standardization are:
1) System weight may be greater.
2) Interconnections within a module are probably greater
because of the two dimensional size restrictions, affect -
ing modular and functional reliability.
61
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The two simplest and least expensive methods for electronic
assembly cooling are cold plate (forced liquid) and convection
(forced air). In a ron-standard package array, the cold plate is
the easier to accomplish. In a standardized array, either method
may be easily incorporated. Looking beyond the rack structure,
however, it becomes apparent that cold plate cooling re quires con-
ductive cooling for each heat producing component in each electronic
package. This requirement will significantly increase the design
and fabrication costs of each package. On the other hand, with con-
vection cooling, few of the components will need special attention.
Most of the components mounted on open PC boards will be sufficiently
cooled by the forced convection. The "hot spots" can be eliminated
by extended surfaces such as fins, or be mounted on thermally con-
ductive structure that contacts the air plenums, providing a heat
sinking path.
Shielded modules may be handled the same as open PC boards if
shielded openings are provided for air flow through the module. If
provision of these openings is not possible, the internal design
must provide for conductive cooling to the module mounting brackets.
Additional cooling can be obtained by placing external fins on the
module.
A high humidity requirement should have little impact on a
convection cooled cabinet, because the cooling air can be a closed
loop with air conditioning separate from that for cabin air.
The redesigned G&C Electronic System, Section VI, dissipates
approximately 750 watts. With all the electronics for that system
in one cabinet, the cooling air requirements will be approximately
5.6 pounds/minute. This number is based on inlet air at 70"F and
exhaust air at 1020F, a temperature range considered adequate for
insuring component reliability. With the ambient cabin air pressure
at 10 psis, this cabinet air flow will be about 125 cfm. With the
plenums sized about 1 x 6 inches this corresponds to a gas velocity
of about 34 mph in the inlet and exhaust plenums.
If convection cooling cannot be used, conversion of a rac'- to
accommodate cold plate cooling is a simple matter. The air plenums
can be re-designed to carry fluid ducts, and in effect, become col•l
plates. The major impact of this change will be the additional de-
sign requirements for the modules.
I0
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Module Site
After the standardized system packaging approach was selected,
one of the decisions to be made was how large should a module be.
This was given considerable attention in the Trade-Off Matri.. Figure
VII-1.
The initial module size was thought of as a PC board contain-
ing 50 flat packs without excessive crowding. This board size was
then varied both larger and smaller to accommodate some different
sized remove-replace electronic functions identified in the Redesign
of Section VI, and studied in the Trade-Off Matrix. Then the option
was introduced for varying the board size to best suit the circuits
being packaged. The resulting module sizes and their nominal flat
pack counts were:
Maximum - 120; large - 80; small - 30; and minimum - 15.
The preference indicated by the totals on the matrix was for
the flexible approach.
Regarding modularity , the primary trade-off concerned a rigidly
standardized module size as opposed to a flexible module size which
we have shown would minimize malfunction detection and checkout com-
plexity. The way in which a module is allowed to vary in size re-
quired some additional study. To vary component height on boards,
and hence the board-to-board spacing, is not a major problem. How-
evur, varying the width and perhaps the length of boards immediately
in .)ects several variables into the cabinet design, and while this
va!iability can be helpful at the module design level, it impairs
many of the advantages that can be derived from standardization. In
particular, the possibility for commonality becomes much smaller.
Therefore, the standard PC (Printed Circuit) beard was defined
as one with a 50 flat pack equivalent size and the module as an as-
sembly consisting of one or more standard PC boards. As module size
becomes large, i.e., equivalent to the black boxes of Block II Apollo,
the resupply weight and volume penalty become severe, mounting and
cooling become inefficient, and the throw-away module becomes very
expensive. Assuming that maintenance and malfunction isolation are
to be pErformed at the removable module level, it was found desirable
to let the module vary from 50 to 500 micro-circuit flat pack equiva-
lent size, or one to ten standard PC boards. This range is drawn from
a consideration of detailed studies on the re-designed Guidance and
Control System, covered in Section VI of this report, with minimi-
zation of malfunction isolation complexity as the prime consideration
in modularizing the system. To achieve module size flexibility over
.3
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this range, the only practical dimensional variation is the number
of boards in a module.
The trade-off of various module sizes on a total system basis
i4 shown in Figure VII-2 and indicates from the totals of the alter-
natives that no one size is significantly optimum. Therefore, spe-
cific penalities and advantages must be examined. The complexity of
malfunction detection and the number of interunit connections are
definitely affected by module size and the spread or range of the
effec t_ is significant. The capability to use commonality at R/R
level is also significantly affected by module size and all three
of these considerations are important to enhance IFM. Therefore,
the majority of the repackaging was done at the smaller one and two
board module sizes.
Some structural schemes and guidelines were generated for the
design of modules. A candidate module design is provided in Figure
VIII-3, and Criteria for packaging is found in Chapter V.
Module Design
In order to facilitate maintainability, we have shown that the
2ackaging should be modular and standardized. Commonality will be
promoted by making functional divisions between identical channels
rather than by combining identical functions of the channels.
For many requirements, a simple PC board could be adequate
whether the design incorporates discrete components, integrated cir-
•	 cuits, MSI, or LSI. With higher density packaging, one of the con-
siderations for functional division is connector pin limitation.
With the requirements for moisture-proofing, the board and components
would be coated and the connector designed as discussed later in this
section.
For planar arrays, the intra-connecting base might be 1 or 2
sided PC boards, or multi-layer PC boards, or even point-to-point
wiring. For volumetrically dense component packaging, many schemes
are available; flat packs as well as discrete components, and cord-
wood modules have been used with solder as well as welded intra-
connections. In addition a number of designs have utilized a com-
bination of planar arrays with the arrays stacked so as to achieve
a high packaging density in modular sub-assemblies; this has been
used primarily for flat pack integrated circuits.
Some very good presentations of various packaging techniques
are given by J. L. Adams (1965), J. L. Easterday, et al. (1966),
t
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G. B. Bunn (1967), S. Drasky (1969), and by C. A. Harper (1969).
These include descriptions cf some very high density assemblies,
particularly the study by G. B. Bunn (1967).
A printed circuit board is a very flexible base for allowing
various kinds of packaging. Tie .nost obvious, of course, is the
planar array of components, but components may also be mounted on
end to conserve real estate en the board. In addition, volumetric
modules of many ty jj3s may be mounted on a PC board. This suggests
that if a PC board is selected as a standard packaging unit, there
is still considerable flexibility within this constraint. Conven-
tional PC boards are surely the easiest design to handle. A low
density double sided board is easy to design and fabricate, anJ
has low cost. As a two-sided board becomes more and more crowded,
the d:sign cost climbs exponentially to the paint that a multilayer
PC board is more economical, even though tooling costs are higher.
Shielding and heat sinking can be easily incorporated in some of
the board layers.
Many hardware programs in the past have suffered from reli-
ability problems with multilayer PC boards. Experience has Droved
that the best way to avoid these problems is to select a highly
competent supplier for these items. While the de.:gn costs of
multilayer boards are high, if the cost is calculated on a per-
connection basis (for example, a resistor is two connections, a
transistor is three, and a 14-lead flat pack with all leads active
is 14 connections), then the per-connection design cost is lower
for a multilayer board than for a considerably less crowded two-
sided PC board.
Many of the electronic systems used will be built in very
small quantities. For this usage, high component densities (equi-
valent to those on multilayer boards) may be achieved with low de-
sign cost by using continuous point-to-point wiring, as presented
by Maxwell and Vinci (1968, 1969).
Shielding of a single PC board is easily done by installing
it in a metal case.
Cabinet Design
A first consideration was to minimize wall space by mounting
the module rack in a drawer. To service a module, the drawer would
slide out, exposing the modules at one side for R/R, and exposing
the wiring and connector pins at the other side. The cabinet would
normally be closed, so the forced air cooling would be essentially
V.
a closed system. The drawer-to-cabinet wiring (mating with a ve-
hicl ,^! cabling connector) would require a service lc	 but its de-
sign would be relatively simple, fhe drawer concepL as several
disadvantages, namely the complexity of the linkages that latch the
drawer and cabinet, the requirement for two separate primary struc-
tures, and the long service loop in the cable which flexes upon
each access.
A review of probable constraints of the system packaging sug-
gested that a see- re restriction on front cabinet panel area was
unlikely. So an iteration was considered in which the front door
of the cabinet was hinged, providing access to the modules for R/R.
For additional testing, access to the module connectors and wiring
was provided by hinging the rack in which the modules were moun::ed.
.main, some allowance had to be made for cable flexing as the rack
swung open, and some of the primary structure had to be duplicated
In both the cabinet and the rack.
Another review of the system constraints suggested that since
the pressure wall of the crew compartment must be accessible for
repair of punctures, equipment should be mounted away from the wall.
A study report in Aviation Week (Himmel, 1969) als-1 indicates this
as a preferred configuration. So a fixed cabinet with fixed module
racks could be used, with hinged 6-)ors front and rear prov?.ding
access to modules and wiring. Doubling; up of primary strucL""-e
would be eliminated and there would be no cable flexing. This ca--
•	 binat	 shown in Figure VII-4. Details of the cooiirg; air flow
are illustrated in Figure VII-5. To provide insight regueding the
volume requirements for the cabinet and module approach taken here,
the redesigned G&C and Telecommunications modules, listed in Table
VI-1 and VI-2, are shown installed in electronics cabinets in
Figures VII-6 and VII-7.
Modularization of Connectors and Cabling
A long life space station presents some unique and challeng-
ing requirements and possibilities, enhanced by the 90-day resupply
vehicle prov4.ding replacement personnel, parts and supplies.
During the life of the °pace station, we can expect technolo-
gies to change to the extent that we may want or need to replace
complete systems, as pointed out by Mueller (1969), and requested
in the Space Station Statement of Work (NASA, 1969x). Major modi-
ficacion or replacement will require replacing cabling in the rack,
and allowance for making these changes can be wade by modulP.rizing
the module connectors and cabling. This can be done by adding
additional connectors to interface between components of a system
that are mounted on different shelves of a rack.
•
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GunnecLors
There are many satisfactory connectors for use in a labora-
tory er-ironment such as rack and panel, PC board and module. A
number oL these are adequate in a dynamic environment such as a
launch, proviied they are engaged and sealed in some way. The
addition of a requirement for disengagement and engagement in a
high tumidity, zero gravity environment introduces some serious
problems in operation and long life.
Considerable experience has been gained in selecting and
applying high reliability connectors in airborne and space elec-
tronic assemblies and the high humidity environment for a chassis
connector is not new. But adding the engage/disengage requirement
in the high humidity is new. The same is true for module connectors.
To find out what experience connector, manufacturers have had with
satisfying this additional requirement, a number of companies were
surveyed, including _pro companies with whom undersea connectors
were discussed. The companies contacted and a summary of their
comments are as follows:
Burndy - Chassis connector. Bantam connectors are ok for
salt water. They recommend changing plating on
shells and pins for engage;'disengage in high humidity
environment.
Burndy - Module connectors. They have made interfacial seals
for some connectors.
AMP	 - Chassis connector. AMP suggested tl.e ARINC connec-
tors that are used on Boeing 747.
AMP	 - Marine connectors. They are now making a feasibility
study on undersea connectors.
(:inch - Chassis connector. They suggest using the MIL-C-$1511
tri-service connector.
Cinch - Module connector. For a pin and socket connector,
they suggested the D-sub-miniature series for which
they make interfacial seals.
Cinch - Module connector, edge board. For this type of con-
nector, they sugg.:jted making a peripheral seal.
ITT Cannon
Electric - Chassis connector. They suggested the CV connector
with an estimated life of 10,000 hours at 400 OF in
free air for SST. They suggested capping the connec-
tors when disengaged because the contaminants being
considered can affect the insulators.
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Viking li,dustries - Marine bulkhead connectors. They have
not built undersea make-and-break connectors,
but as company funds p-rmit they are currently
working on a design for this.
Amphenol - Chassis connectors. The 348 series connectors
have a positive pin-to-pin interfacial seal that
should provide positive insulation against water
droplets.
Amphenol. - Marine bulkhead connectors. They make two series
but not for engage/disengage. For salt water en-
vironments they suggested sealing wire-to-solder
,joint -to-connector using shrinkable tubing over
the wire and solder joint. This is then coated
with GE Marine Seal. This treatment has lasted
for 5 years on marine equipment sub .jrcted to ocean
waves.
Deutsch -
	
Chassis connectors. The DBA series connectors
have a positive pin-to-pin interfacial seal that
should insulate against water drops.
The companies surveyed had several general comments regarding
connectors for engage/disengage use in a high humidity environment.
They were:
1) Power should be off when engaging/disengaging.
2) Connectors should be blown off with a dry gas or an
absorbent material should be provided to remove moisture
droplets before engaging.
3) Platings should be selected; possibly chrome for connec-
tor shells and heavy gold for connector pints.
Testing and/or development of connectors for high humidity
engagement is an extensive undertaking. However, there is a large
fund of experience in some aspects of the problem. In a NASA funded
IBM Study (IBM, 1965) PC board pin and socket connectors were grease
impregnated and sealed with a rubber squeegie. These have been oper-
ated and disengaged and engaged in water containing salt and urea
and then tested for electrical resistance. Rack and panel connectors
have been built that offer positive plastic seas around each indivi-
dual pin.
The above indicates that a minimum .cuncunt of additional cesting
and development vill result in connectors that will perfarm well
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through disconnect-connect, or remove-replace in a high humidity,
zero gravity environme[LL.
Even an edge-board connector for a PC beard can be developed.
A possible configuration is shown in Figure VII-8 wherein a plastic
squeegie is bonded to the connector face to seal out moisture drop-
lets when the board is out of the connector. The connector fingers
on the PC board could be coated with a high wettability, water-proof
oil to provide additional protection.
Shielding
In addition to modular shielding discussed above, subsystem
and system shielding may be designed into the cabinet, consisting
of shielded cable races and panels, or shrouds, that compartmental-
ize the racks. These items combined with modular cabling would make
it possible for a vendor to supply both system modules and system
cabling and connectors. All items including electronic, cabling and
connector modules would be checked out before delivery, and can be
plugged into the rack.
Idea Model
A model was built that is a truncated mockup of the last iter-
ation for the standardized cabinet. Photos of the model are pro-
vided in Figures VII-9, -10 and -11 at the end of this section. It
incorporates the provision for modular cabling. A module mounting
frame member was fabricated to be a close approximation of the detail
involved in a dual air plenum. Several types of modules and PC boards
are included in the model, using several kinds of connectors. The ma-
jor difference in this model and expected design is that the final
detail would consist of a pair of simple extrusions rather than a com-
bination of detail parts. The intent in this, as in all other parts
of the model is to stimulate ideas - possibly for totally different
concepts - in addition to demonstrating the flexibility of this par-
ticular concept.
The connectors included in the model are:
Masterite Industries
005AD55-DR-I-D
Printed circuit edge. connector
110 contacts (55 per sale)
Contact rating -0.5 auip., 250
contact on .05 inch center
Other configurations available
VAC
- 120 contacts maximum
May be keyed - each key uses 4 contact positions
Also available in .100 inch contact spacing with 3 amp,
1200 VAC rating.
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Burndy Corporation
UPC2A41P-4
UPC2A41R-4
Printee circuit pin and socket connector
41 contacts
Contact rating -3 amps, 300 VAC at 60 Rz
Available in other configurations up to 92 contacts
No provisions available for keying. The PC board may
be keyed to the mother board
Cinch Manufacturing
65- 608A-1
65-608A-2
Module connector
92 contAct`
No. 20 contacts rated 3 amps, 1500 VAC, ISIS
Solder pot terminations
Connector contains jacking
withdrawal
screw to aid insertion and
4
Shells are polarized by guide pigs
May be keyed by replacing some pins with dust plugs
In the same connector shell outline, other configurations
are available with various arrangem©nts of the No. 20
contacts, standard coaxial contacts. Plax'al coaxial
contacts, 40 and 80 amp contacts, and test jacks.
Cinch Manufacturing
65-721
Printed circuit edge connector
114 contacts (57 per side)
Contact rating 1 amp, 500 volts
Contacts on .05 inch centers
May be keyed using nylon keys
The same configuration is available with contacts on .1.00
inch centers, rated 3 amps, 500 volts
This design is a zero insertion and withdrawal force con-
nector. After board insertion, a pair of cams are turned
actuating devices that press the connector fingers against
the board.
This connector shell is made of lexan which is presently
considered unsuitable for spacecraft cabins, but a suitable
substitute should be available.
This connector was made for a short board, but the design
and tooling could be modified for a longer board.
VII-21
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Deutsch
•	 DBA series
•	 RBC74H-19-OYN
DBA77-19-OSN
Cable connector
Push-pull quick disconnect coupling with positive, ball-
lock coupling mechanism
Contacts are crimp terminated, Meal insertion rear re-
moval
Available with up to 61 contacts
Triple seas clamp around each wire at rear entrance and
a positive interfacial seal around each pin is provided
at the connector interface.
Deutsch
RSM series
RSM5105-12-14P
R%107-12-14S
A miniature series cable connector
Available with up to 91 contacts
Same push-pull Feature as the DBA series
Crimp connections
The ,jam•_nut- mounted panel connector in the model has a
hermetically sealed insert. Wire corznction to this is
with a crimp-on, rear insertion, srap-in connection.
The connector in the model dc:es not have the stepped
interfacial seal around each pin that is in the DBS
series connector. However new seal molds have been
made, and this stepped seal is on new builds.
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VIII - TEST AND CHEMOUT
Thu teat and checkout function, as defined later in this
section, is a prime consideration for in-flight mainLonance,
and w1 11 be f0 trod interwoven with virtually i-vary ether aspect
of our study. In examining the test and checkout philosophy
and requirumunLs, it was considered necessary to seek tbu counsel
of key pursonnel from the following programs: Computurized Aut(,-
maLic Ground Equipment (CAGE), On-Board Checkout System (005),
MulLi-InrameLer Display (MPD), and Built-In CheckouL (BIC).
Their thoughts and experience, along; with the Lrade-offs
in this study, a research of the literature, and an in-depth
analysis and redesign of the Apollo Block 11 G&N, SCS and Telc-
communications System all shaped the final conclusions. Through-
out, it should be recognized that the prime concern was with mal-
function isolation, with lesser emphasis on operational checks or
data gathering.
The test and checkout system must perfc,rm the three prin-
ciple tasks of critical failure monitoring, failure isolation,
and system checkout and verification. There is some interrela-
tionship between the three functions, but they are basically
three distinct tasks. The following paragraphs will discuss the
requirements of these tasks and then develop the rationale for
designing a system to meet the overall set of requirements.
Failure Monitoring
The equipment used in failure moniitorl, is often called
the caut;on and warning (CAW) system. This equ )ment must
continuously monitor critical sub-systems, such as life support
subsystems, and issue an audio-visual alarm if abnormal opera-
tion is detected. Certain important but non-critical signals
such as power supply voltages are often monitored by the CAW
system as well. This monitoring function is continuous and auto-
matic and involves a comparison of measured parameters with pre-
determined tolerances. Any out-of-tolerance condition results
Li one or more alarms, Since many of the monitored parameters "
are life critical, redundancy is required.
A goal would be to achieve 100% detection of all critical
•	 malfunctirns. The degree to which this can be achieved is de-
tertr.i,ted by the ability of the designers of the systems monitored
to predict the failure modes of those systems and the methods by
which the failures can be detected. For the critical parameters,
6
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it 1:: nsswnu l the ability to detect malfunctions will not be
compromised to reduce the complexity of the CAW system. For the
non-critical parameters a trade-off will be discusser) in more
(IcLail laLer regarding; overall Last and checkout system design.
Thv Lypes of nignalH monitored by the CAW system include
unrclog, hi-level and digital. In order to process these signals,
sLorc• the LolcrancrH, make the necessary decision, and take the
required actions, some special purpose or general purpose com-
puter is indicat:e( l . :t is possible, but not necessarily desir-
a1)1e, t.0 nhare this function with some other function sucli as
guidance and control; in fact, Moeller ( 969) has :;Lated Lhe
dusirabilily of decen'rali y ing the computer functions.. This
trade-oft muHL t , c wade considering; the overall elecLrunics syn-
Lem requirements.
In addition to generating alarms, certain types of failures
may requi.re
 immediate corrective action which cr.nnot wait for
operator intervention. An example of this might be fire detec-
tion. For those cases the CAW system would provide for an alit-o-
matic command capability to take the necessary corrective action.
Many of the malfunctions which can occur on the spacecraft
need not be monitored, and will be determined by the crew during;
normal operational activity. Certain communications or vehicle
and experiment control operations fall in this category. Manual-
ly selectable backup modes may be employed until the malfunction
can be corrected. This is typical of present-day aircraft oper-
ation.
Failure IsulaL-iun
It is not practical to design equipment with a 100% proba-
bility of no failures over a ten year life span. Therefore,
some degree of repair capability is required, however, in order
to repair a system it is necessary to isolate the malfunction.
For this study the repair was limited to remove and replace -
a very reasonable ground rule, since repair to the component
level requires extremely sophisticated and complex test equip-
ment, and a high le-il of crew knowledge and training. In addi-
tion it requires	 fations such as dncapsulation soldering,
encapsulation so' ring and welding which will be difficult and
perhaps impossible in the first space station environments. As
experience in space station operations increases, this ground
rule will need to be re-evaluated, but it seems likely that
economics will favor the remove and replace concept for a con-
siderable period of time.
E.
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It is possible to achieve a high degree of confidence tic
isolating a failure with a malfunction isolation system by ,e-
signing very ve,­tiatile and complex equipment capable of pro-
viding a wide variety of stimuli and of measuring a multitude
of signal types. This approach places no constraints on the
desif;n ( ► f the systems to be tested, but will usually result in
a malfunction isolation system which is more complex than neces-
r;ary for any particular application. The ot.'rator training re-
quirements may also be large.
A ;,referrable approach is to force the electronics system
designee—
 co make their systems testable in a relatively simple
fash'on uFing a minimum of external stimuli. If the stimuli are
peculiar to that equipment, serious consideration should be given
to integral stimulus circuits requiring only a discrete or digital
command .o control them. This design for testability has the dual
advantage., of simplifying the test equipment and of increasing the
probability that a malfunction can be isolated. The malfunction
isolation system can be designed to fit the particular application.
It should be modular in design so that changes and additions to
the electronics systems can be accommodated easily. This ability
will be aided by the use of a standard testing philosophy which
will be used wherever possible.
The malfunction isolation system can be made to have almost
any desired degree of automatic test capability. In general, some
operator action will be required, and a trade-off must be made be-
tween operator training requirements and test equipment complexi-
ty and reliability.
The malfunction isolation system must be able to isolate a
failure to the lowest replac(able unit with a reasonable proba-
bility of success without any assistance external to the spacecraft.
The probability of success is a function of test equipment complex-
ity and operator training, t;hich requires that a trade-off be made
for each particular application. The Space Base Study (NASA-1969b)
indicates that a 95% to 98% probability of success is desired.
System Verification
It is necessary to verify the electronic system operation
prior to critical maneuvers and following any repair actions.
The test points for system verification are most likely a subset
of those used for malfunction isolation, but the stimuli require-
ments may he different. Certainly the test procedure will be
different for the two functions.
16
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'Che frrncLions „I Ina liuuct i()n isolation and Systu ►n veri1 ica-
L t on will not he reclu i red s i ►no 1 Larwous ly, therefore an effort
.1 .horrld be madL to share hardware I,uLween thes,! two functions.
'!'Iris ,;harin,; of hardware is c-,isily realized III
	
test system b,rilt
ar(irn;d a general purpose computer.
The System verification function also performs malfunction
detection for those non-critical parameters not monitored by the
GAW systu ►n. A related task which could also be performed is that
of trend analysis. By keeping a history of the measured paraim-tur!.,
It is often possible to predict a malfunction before it (.ccur^;.
This is a particularly important consideration for '.ire life critical
systems. Trund analysis requires large data storage capability and
moderately large amounts of calculaLion Linre, however, need nut be
clone on ;I 	 basis. Where trend analysis i.!; a requirem ► wnt ,
a trade-off needs to be made between on-board and ground proce:.sing.
This is one area where autonom-)us operation is not mandatory.
System verification in the event of replacement of a complete
system is a sLi.11 different consideration. As technology advances,
certainty some systems will bu rendered -)bsoleLe, and replacement will
be desirable. It is recommended that such new systems be verified in
-I 	 spacecraft, duplicating the structure and systems in the or-
biting space station. Such a house spacecraft would have the follow-
ing uses related to th i s study:
1) Insure electromagnetic compatibility.
2) Test form, fit and function for new products or product
irnprover,rent cycles.
3) Provide simulation to determine operational limits of
systems or subsystems.
4) Verify hardware and software for malfunction isolation
and detection.
5) Verify hardware, software and procedures for on-board
support equipment utilization.
System resign Considerations
For the initial discussion of the: system design, the CAW sys-
tem will be ignored. It has specific requirements, many of which
cannot be compromised. It is of necessity a centralized automatic
monitoring system. After consideration of the malfunction isola-
tion and system verification design tradeoffs, the CAW system will
again be considered as to how it might blend with the other two
functions.
VIII-5
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a^^d s;y!;tcrn; veri f Icat Ion, aver I hwigh the test procedures wl l l be
d i 1 1 c • r,-nt .
	 It i.-, po,;r l h lc.- to conk l dc2r nomet.h i rig as simple  as a
mult:Imeter for ,m e asuring AC and DC voltage-; at various test: points
within the --;ystem. An analysis was made of titer Block I I Apollo sys-
tems which Indicate(] that mot;t catastrophic failures and many out-
of-tolerance failures could be detected and isolated w1th this simple
testing instrument. The operat,r training requirements would be quite
large becatise an intimate knowledge of the systems under test is re-
quired. The confidence level for either failure de_tc^ction or isola-
tion is not adequate. In summary, Ciis I:. not an acceptable check-
out syst!rn, however it is of interest to consider a trade-off of a
centralized vs a decentralized system on this simple testing; con-
cept.
^.ssumc for now that all required stirnull are built Into the
systems under test. The decentral.i.zed system would require an opera-
tor to move about the spacecraft activating the required stimuli and
rr,easuring the necessary parameters. Two or more operators may be re-
quired fcr certain tests, creating some coordination problems. There
will have to be many multimeters built into the equipment, or the
operator will carry one instrument which he will attach to the test
points. 7 1, : first option requirs:s a large duplication of equipment;
• the second produces a system hazard from operator error and possible
Conn_* , -r contamination. The operator would have to carry the main-
tent; ,l ce manuals with him, and these are voluminous. Many of the
.	 functional loops traverse a large portion of the spacecraft, and
would require extensive operator travel to check them out.
The centralized system would have all test points and stimuli
control lines available at a central location. The weight penalty
of wiring can be nearly eliminated by the use of multiplexed data
bus techniques. The operator need not move about and has all re-
ference manuals conveniently available. There is no requirement for
uncapping connectors or probing test points so that operator error
and contamination hazard are minimized. There has been some addi-
tional multiplexing Hardware required, but this is considerably less
than the a0di.tional hardware required for mar,y built-in multimete.s.
The conclusion is that a centralized system is desirable for even
this simple approach. The decision becomes even more obvious as the
test equipment complexity becomes greater.
• It is now of interest to consider the deficiencies of the cen-
tralized multimeter system. Tile multimeter cannot interface directly
with digital information, particularly where the data is serial and
•	 possibly encoded in some manner. It is, therefore, necessary to have
some digital data processing capability built into the central unit.
I
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Care must be taken to control the individual system designers so that
the variety of digital signal types does not get out of hand. The
multimeter sloes not have the abilit y
 to measure transient rLsponses.
This type of measurement is often important and therefore should be
included. The exact implementation can be Fairly simple such as a
timer and a sample-and-hold circuit, or complex such as an oscil-
loscope. The initial consideration was to have all stimuli built
into the systems ender test. It is more efficient to have the more
common stimulus types with multiple usage in the central test equip-
ment and multiplexed to the re quired points. The unique stimuli
should remain bu i lt into the systems under test.
The process of increasing the testing capability can go on
almost indr--finitely, going to computers and automatic testing pro-
cedures, etc. This other extreme, a multimillion dollar computerized
checkout system, perhaps functionally typified by the ground checkout
sytems like ACE and CAGE (Titen HIM system), is also not acceptable.
The problem then is to come to a reasonable compromise. Figure
VIII-1 is a graphic illustration of some of the more important con-
siderations. It is desirable to have a large confidence that fail-
ures will be detected and isolated. It is evident that the more com-
plex the checkout system becomes, the larger the confidence. It is
also clear that the confidence is never 1007, and that the curve bc-
comer, gsrite flat bfvond some value of complexity. To achieve 100A
confidence, special equipment with a team of experts may need to be
brought up from Earth on a demand basis, or even kept on the stati.on
for some initial activation period.
Another important factor is checkout system reliability. The
larger and more complex the checkout system, the lower its relia-
bility and the more stringent are :ts calibration requirements. The
large effort required to keep electronics lab te:,.t equipment ir. prop-
er working order and adjustment provides an insight into the problem.
A third important factor is operator training and intelligence
requirements. As previously stated, the simplest checkout system re-
quires of the operator an intimate knowledge of the system under test.
He must be capable of making decisions based on very subtle system
performance changes. On the other extreme t t-e very complex checkout
system requires the operator have an intimate knowledge of the check-
out system and its capabilities. At some intermediate point this
requirement is a minimum.
The exact shape of the curves in Figure VIII can only be de-
termined for a specific example. The correct point on the curves
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can he s;elected by applying the IrM inatr i x Introduced ear l i car to the
checkout systern trad( , -,)ff as damonstr.at '!d in the example i„ lot./.
h rrcv the checkout system of the . correct complr•xi ty has hc.ar,
sc , lcct ed fo ,• malfunction Isola ►
 ion and sy:,tem vari t icat ion, the CAW
;ystc •m can ba integrated into the system to the extant_ po; , ;ib]!• or
clr<;i sable.
	 'i'he overall checkout syS'tcm wii,l probably he raclun(tant
with the possibility of having operator console; in more than one
spaceer;.ft compartment. The redundant sySLems shout' also have the
capability of checking each other.
f. x amp I'!
Three malfunction isolation systems will be considered for the•
redesigned G&(: s ystem. All three are cencralized systems, however
thr- sophisLication of the systems is widc!ly variant. The IFM matrix
of Figure VIII-2 formalizes the trade-off thought processes used i
eva!uating these systems.
Thfs evaluation is based on orly one system, the redesign(-d
G&C (Section VI), and on weighting factors which are subject to dis-
cussion; consequently it is intended to serve as an example for illus-
trativr purposes only. Refer to Figures VI-13, SPS ON/OFF circui or
V1_15, Rite/Attitude Error Display, as typical of the circuits ce
siderc' during this trade-off.. The following defines the three f;J rams,
and develops the rationale for the weightin c, factors and matrix. (-ntric•s.
The simplest system consists of a mr,ILimeter with manual range
selection. I'he mater can measure AC and 1X; voltages and currc:rLs.
The data points are accessed through a remote multiplexed YAM data buss.
There are stimuli provided where not already inherent 1-i the %C sys-
tems hardware. The intermec:'.ate system has the measuring and stimulus
capability of the simple system, and in addition a time controlled
sample and hold measurement capability. A central Step function gene-
rator is a- addition to thL stimulus capability. A Multi-Parameter
Display (MPD) device. .s used for meter display as well as instruction
and tolerance information display (Martin Marietta Corporation, 1966).
Th y MPD is keyboard controlled. There is automatic call-ur of display
formats foi each requested data measurement. The most complex, syst(-"
I
,; it complete (fin-Board Checkout System (Mart irr Marietta Corporation
190) as developed by Martin Marietta Corporation for NASA-MSC.
from the basic 11-N Matrix., the following items were judged to
have no influence for this trade-off; expendables, number of inherent
Interconnections, cannibalization, tool complexity, short term reli-
ability, system 14fe exper . icy and commonality. Malfunction detec-
tion/checkout complexity is :,ot included since that is the trade-off
being made.
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The special feature of confidence in isolating a malfunction
was considered the pacing parameter. All other parameter weights
were selected relative to this one. The recurring cost parameter
is significant in this application, as it includes the cort factor
associated with bringing up special personnel and equipment to iso-
late failures that the checkout system failed to isolate.
As indica-lec: by the totals on Figure VIII-2 the trade-off re-
sulted in the selection of a medium complexity system. It should
be remembered that is based on a Guidance and Control system that
was redesigned to facilitate test and checkout and is comprised
prim,Nily of signal processing electronics plus a few reasonably
straightforward sensors. A similar analysis dealing with a system
of many relatively inaccessible sensors, controls and actuating
devices will undoubt-odly modify the conclusions. Nonetheless, the
example illustrates what is felt to be a useful technique for evalu-
ating test and checkout requirements and arriving at an optimum sys-
tem.
The optimum test and checkout system, incidentally, ,hould
take advantage of technology being advanced in several systems
currently under development, including the On-Board Checkout Sys-
tem (OCS) and the Built-In Checkout System (BIC). (The latter is
similar to a concept known as BITE; see Logicki, 1968).
We have concluded from this study that the designers should:
1) Design modules for testability.
2) Minimize externally generated stimuli.
3) Minimize test points for unique stimuli.
4) Build stimulus generators into modules.
S) Condition unique oi • unusual signals to normal level
within the module.
6) Utilize B1T or BIST* techniques wherever advantageous.
It may be noted that all of the above are proposed in an
effort to reduce total system complexity (system under test and
checkout system) while maintaining or increasing the level of con-
fidence of isolating a malfunction or obtaining the desired data.
* BIT - Built In Test. This concept indicates module status in
a passive way - no s'-.inulus required.
BIST - Built In System Test. Stimuli may be required, but are
furnished by other system elements.
reality to reduce coEt
The example presented
a closed air cooling
the optimum solution,
ndard packaging approach
oblems like cooling and
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LX. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions from this study can be grouped into three
major categories; program considerations, system considerations,
and areas for future study. The program considerations are
those tools and techniques which arr_ important for program manage-
ment from the top levels down through the detailed system designer,
and are considerations which will affect the resulting system de-
sign. The system consideration3 are particular areas of concern
which require continued emphasis throughout all pleases of the pro-
gram. The following paragraphs will discuss the three categories.
Program Considerations
The gro.ind rules, constraints and 	 ► eria should be identified
early in any development program, and 	 of current by updating them
as the program proceeds. It is necessary to ensure appropriate
consideration of these items and to enable evaluation of the deci-
sions made using them as a oasis. The IF4 matrix developed during
this study has proven to be an excellent means of accomplishing
the above requirement (objective). When the ground rules, con-
straints and criteria are en'-ered into the matrix with appropriate
weighting factors, it becomes a tool for trade-off decision-making
at all levels of management and throu;h aii phases of the program,
and also serves as a quick reference method for documenting the
decisions and their supporting analyses. Another tool developed
(luring the study which has proven very valuable, is the Boolean
equation approach to failure mode analysis. This approach allows
rapid identification of problem areas and overdesigned areas.
System Considerations
The considerations listed below were selected because of
their program importance and the lack of emphasis placed on these
items cn past programs.
6
l; Standard packaging must become a
and improve system. reliability.
is a rack and pane: ap proach with
system. This is not presented as
but as an illustration that a sta
is feasible and that difficult pr
connectors cat be solved.
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2. The basic system design must include checkout considera-
tions for all;long liter missions, since complete reliance
on redundancy for long life is not feasible, therefore
repair capability is a requirement. The checkout system
complexity can be affected significantly by designing the
system to be tes*able. Within the ground rules, criterii
and limitations of this study, it was concluded that the
checkout system should be centralized and of intermediate
complexity with a limited amount of built-in stimulL in
the system under test.
3. The remove and replace module size should be determined by
choosing a system functional block as a module. This
simplifies checkout, provides the maximum commonalit y 'or
modules of appropriate size for remove and replace, and
does not unduly complicate the standard packaging approach.
4. Use of standard packaging and common functional modules
needs to be accomplished on an interprogram basis.
S. The two specific areas of power supplies and displays are
prime candidates for commonality and standard designs
which can be applied within a program as well as across
several programs.
Areas for Additional Study
The following areas have been identified as being particularly
important to in-flight maintenance, but which were not covered in
this study. Some of these could have fallen within the scope of this
effort, bu y
 were excluded because of limitations on budget.
Sensors and Actuators - Unlike processing electronics, sensors
and actuators exhibit a diversity of package types, electro-
mechanical devices and spezia l. features. This diversity makes
generalization difficult, but a maintenance philosophy con-
cerning these items must be developed concurrently with that
of processing electronics. Many of the criteria developed in
the present study will doubtlessly be applicable, but a sizable
cross section of the sensors and actuators should be studied
in this respect, with new criteria being generated as neces-
sary.
The checkout and calibration of these devices also presents
a challenge that should be worked along with in-flight mainten-
ance.
r-
_r
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Mechanics and Hydraulics - Presently an in-flight maintenance
study is underway which concerns propulsion systums, but if
none are in progress on mechanics and hydraulics, they should
he initiated. The criteria developed should be ' correlated with
those developed for electronics to insure a unified approach
Lo IFM,
Display and Controls - While greatly different than sensors
and actuators, the displays and controls likewise exhibit a
,treat diversi.Ly and often uniqueness. A comprehensive study
of in-flight maintainability of Lhese items is needed.
Checkout and Malfunction Isolation - Our checkout and mal-
function isolation philosophy was drawn from a set of require-
ments that admittedly do not cover the totality of electronics
to be found in a spacecraft. Further .equirements from such
areas as sensors, actuators, displays, controls and processing
electronics other than those studied are necessary in order
to develop the proper configuration for a checkout and mal-
function isolation system. It is our rec^mmendation that the
checkout system be structured to meet requirements, not vice-
versa.
Interprogram Commonality - It seems feasible to design and
package electronic modules so that they would be interchange-
able between dissimilar vehicles, for instance the space base
and space shuttle. While w.: found a disappointingly low mo-
dule commonality in the systtms w_- studied, it is nonetheless
probable that different programs will indeed need some similar
functional electronics, and the degree of commonality might
well be High ^nough to warrant a coordination effort.
IFM Experiement - It is our opinion that an experiment is need-
ed to test criteria, packaging and checkout philoso phy for in-
flight maintenance. Needless to say, the hardware and condi-
tions should approximate Lhose expected on the space station.
I
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X.	 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACE	 - Automatic Checkout Equipment
A/D	 - Analogy;/Digital
AM	 - Amplitude Modulated
ASCP	 - Attitude Set Control Panel
BIC	 - Biiilt	 in Checkout
BIT	 - Built in Tet
BITE	 - Built in Test Equipment
BIST	 - Built in System Test
(;&W o r
CAW	 - Cuation and Warning
(:AGE
	 - Computerized Aerospace Ground Equipment
CDR	 - Commander
CDU	 - Coupling Data Unit
CFM	 - Cubic Ft./Min.
CM	 - Command Module
CMC	 - Command Module Computer
CMG
	 - Control Moment Gyro
CMP	 - Command Module Pilot
CSC
	 - Cosecant
CSM	 - Command/Service Module
CTE	 - Central Timing Equipment
D&C	 - Displays and Controls
D/A	 - Digital/Analog
DRG
	 - Digital Ranging Generator
DSKY
	 - Display Keyboard
DSE	 - Data Stot	 ge Equipment
ECA	 - Electronic Control Assembly
EDA	 - Electronic Display Assembly
EEC	 - Enable Error Counter
EMI	 - Electromagnetic Interference
EVA
	 - Extra Vehicular Activity
FDAI	 - Flight Director/Attitude Indicator
FL	 - Filter
FLAW	 - Functional Loop/Alternate Ways
FM	 - Frequency Modulated
FMEA	 - Failure Mode Effects Analysis
G & C	 - Guidance and Control
G & N	 - Gui.dance and Navigation
GA	 - Gyfo Assembly
GDC	 - Gyro Display Coupler
GP/FPI - Gimbal Position/Fuel Pressure Indicator
HG	 - High Gain
IF	 - Intermediate Frequency
X-2
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS - continued
IFM	 - In.-Flight Maintenance
IMU	 - Inertial Measurement Unit
ISS	 - Inertial Subsystem
KW	 - Kilowatt
X(Lambda) Failure Rate
LM	 - Lunar Module
LMP	 - Lunar Module Pilot
LRU	 - Lowest Reptaceable Unit
LSI	 - Large Scale Integration
MC	 - Megacycle
MDA	 - Motor Drive Amplifier
MDIV	 - Malfunction Defection, Isolation and Verifi-
cation
MOD	 - Modulator
MPD	 - Multi Parameter Display
MSA	 - Main Summing Amplifier
MSI	 - Medium Scale Integration
MXR	 - Mixer
OCS	 - On-Board Checkout System
OSS	 - Optical Subsystem
PAM	 - Pulse Amplitude Modulated
PC	 - Printed Circuit
PCM	 - Pulse Code Modulated
PIPA	 - Pulse integrated Pendulous Accelerometer
PEA	 - PIPA Electronics Assembly
PGNCS	 - Primary Guidance, Navigation and Control System
PM	 - Phase Modulated
PMP	 - Pre-Modulation Processor
PPS	 - Pulses per Second
PS	 - Power Supply
PSA
	 - Power Servo Amp.
PSIA	 - Pounds/Square Inch Ambient
PTT	 - Push to Talk
PVR	 - Precision Voltage Reference
R/R	 - Remove/Replace
RC	 - Rotation Control
RCS	 - Reaction Control System
RCV	 - Receiver
RF	 - Radio Frequency
RFP	 - Request for Proposal
RJEC	 - Reaction Jet On/Off Control
RRT	 - Rendezvous Radar Transponder
SCS	 - Stabilization and Control System
a
i
J
X-3
•
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS - continued
SCE
	 - Signal Conditioning Equi •
	ent
SCT
	 - Scanning; Telescope
SM	 - Service Module
SPS	 - Service Propulsion System
SS	 - Space Station
SXT	 - Sextant
TC	 - Translation Control
TVC	 - Thrust Vector Control
TVSA	 - Thrust Vector Servo Assembly
UDL	 - Up Data Link
USBE	 - Unified S-Band Equipment
VAC	 - Volts A.C.
VCO	 - Voltage Controlled Oscillator
VDC	 - Volts D.C.
VHF	 - Very High Frequency
XFRMR	 - Transformer
XMIT	 - Transmitter
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